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Chapter 1.   INTRODUCTION 
1.1. The context 
EU Competition law enforcement has limited means to accomplish its goals. In all cases, it is done 
through intervention performed in ex ante or ex post manner. Ex ante intervention occurs in 
mergers which are assessed as to their compatibility with EU competition law under the EU Merger 
Regulation.1 Ex post intervention is applied in respect of Art. 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning 
of the European Union (TFEU)2 which is aimed at preventing anticompetitive agreements and Art. 
102 TFEU which concerns anticompetitive unilateral conduct of dominant undertakings. The two 
Treaty articles and the Merger Regulation comprise the three existing routes for EU competition 
law enforcement. Each one is designed for a particular kind of situation, while jointly they are 
supposed to cover the whole spectrum of anticompetitive conduct on any given market. However, 
there is a growing number of practices that might have a negative impact on consumer welfare 
while technically falling outside of the scope of any of the above-mentioned provisions. Situations 
like this are known as enforcement gaps3. Although it is a well-known problem of competition law 
enforcement, there is no quick solution. Enforcement gaps occur due to two fundamental reasons. 
First, in general, the EU’s competition law system is built on an inductive approach. It formulates 
its position in respect of new market practices mainly through case law. Judges in their turn often 
avoid relying on new economic theories in their decisions whilst the former are still in dispute. 
Limited by the parties’ pleas, they also might not have a chance to discuss a new theoretical 
approach long after it was developed in academic writings. As a result, case law development often 
trails behind market novelties. The other reason can be found in a long-lasting fundamental 
confusion which goes back to an unresolved question, namely what is the objective of competition 
                                                 
1 Council Regulation (EC) 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between undertakings (EC Merger Regulation) 
[2004] OJ L24/1 [hereinafter Merger Regulation]. 
2 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102, 2012 O.J. (C 326) 47 
[hereinafter TFEU]. 
3  On the enforcement gap under art. 102 see Federico Etro and Ioannis Kokkoris, Competition Law And The 
Enforcement Of Article 102 (Oxford University Press 2011) 139. On enforcement gap in merger control see 'Summary 
Of Replies To The Public Consultation On Evaluation Of Procedural And Jurisdictional Aspects Of EU Merger 
Control' (Ec.europa.eu, 2017) 




law.4 Concepts of consumer harm and benefit that are central to this question are good examples 
to support the point. Understanding of a consumer benefit concept constantly changes as well as 
the interests of the consumer as an objective category.5 The same is true in respect to the concept 
of competition on merit which remains pretty vague regardless of the amount of times it was used 
as an ultimate argument proving or excluding the infringement. Case law developments are also 
usually late in responding to new practices due to technical reasons.6 Even when the harmful effect 
of a new practice becomes widely recognized, traditional competition law tools might be not 
entirely suitable for a new situation. Their blunt application may lead to under or over enforcement. 
A good example is externalities between different sides of platforms for which traditional 
quantitative tools do not account. An obvious solution to the problem would be a wider and, at the 
same time, more detailed interpretation of core concepts and adjustment of the enforcement tools 
to the new realities. The question of how to accomplish this task in the best way remains open. 
Academic literature makes suggestions in respect of both points but not much of it has yet found 
its application in relevant case law.7 The present dissertation does not seek to resolve the long-
standing debate on tools and concepts adjustments. Nevertheless, within the frame of the 
mentioned debate, the research question has gained its importance and actuality due to the new 
insight into the competition on merit phenomenon it provides.8 The research question focusses the 
analysis on two presumably equivalent situations, similar in every aspect except for the type of 
                                                 
4 The theory of consumer welfare regards allocative efficiency as a central issue while deontological theories are 
concentrated on dynamic efficiencies. See Ioannis Lianos, 'Some Reflections On The Question Of The Goals Of EU 
Competition Law' (2013) CLES Working Paper Series 3/2013 SSRN Electronic Journal 2. Also see Ariel Ezrachi, 
'EU Competition Law Goals And The Digital Economy' [2018] SSRN Electronic Journal 6. On the critique of 
European Commission focusing on competition as an end and not as a mean to achieve higher efficiency or consumer 
welfare see Renato Nazzini, The Foundations Of European Union Competition Law (OUP Oxford 2014) 1. Laura 
Parret, 'The Multiple Personalities Of EU Competition Law: Time For A Comprehensive Debate On Its Objectives', 
in Daniel Zimmer (ed), The Goals of Competition Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2012). 
5 On static and dynamic efficiencies see Mark Blaug, 'Is Competition Such A Good Thing? Static Efficiency Versus 
Dynamic Efficiency.' (2004) 19 Review of Industrial Organization 37. On economic efficiency see Gregory T. 
Gundlach and Diana Moss, 'The Role Of Efficiencies In Antitrust Law' (2015) 60 The Antitrust Bulletin 91. 
6 For the average duration of proceedings in General Court and in the Court of Justice see Court of Justice of the 
European Union, 'Press Release No 36/18. Judicial Statistics 2017: The Number Of Cases Brought Has Once Again 
Exceeded 1 600.' (2018) <https://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/application/pdf/2018-03/cp180036en.pdf> 
accessed 7 September 2018. 
7  For a compilation of academic opinions on the adjustment of competition law enforcement tools see OECD, 
'Rethinking Antitrust Tools For Multi-Sided Platforms.' (2018) <http://www.oecd.org/competition/rethinking-
antitrust-tools-for-multi-sided-platforms.htm> accessed 29 August 2018 [hereinafter OECD, 'Rethinking Antitrust 
Tools For Multi-Sided Platforms' (2018)]. For OECD approach to the definition of competition on merit see OECD, 
'Competition On The Merits (Best Practices Roundtable)' (2015) <http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/7/13/35911017.pdf.> 
accessed 1 September 2018. 
8 Renato Nazzini, 'Google And The (Ever-Stretching) Boundaries Of Article 102 TFUE' (2015) 6 Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice 301. 
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connections between the markets. That approach will allow the evaluation of the importance of 
externalities for competition law enforcement in isolation from any other complicating factors. For 
the purpose of this dissertation, the type of conduct subjected to analysis is not essential as long as 
it can be used by undertakings in a dominant position to promote their own products or services 
on related markets. The selected conduct for this dissertation is the extension of a dominant 
position onto adjacent markets since it is a very intuitive and attractive practice for platforms. The 
behaviour becomes increasingly popular due to the lack of regulation and to the significant 
competitive advantages it can provide when performed on a new unsaturated market. Choosing 
such behaviour as exemplary contested conduct will also allow the analysis and discussion to profit 
from an abundant body of case law and decisional practice on its most common forms.   
1.2. Research question and methodology 
The key research question of this dissertation is whether competition law enforcement should 
distinguish and treat differently leveraging practices that extend a dominant position from one 
platform to another and leveraging practices that are implemented to the same effect between two 
sides of the same platform. These two practices will be referred to as inter- and intra-platform 
leveraging respectively. 
In order to answer the research question, the following structure has been adopted. As a first step, 
the main academic ideas on multisidedness, platforms and leveraging are summarised sketching 
the map of theoretical findings in the area. It allows the concepts of inter and intra-platform 
leveraging to be introduced in an appropriate context. Next, a coherent line of case law reflecting 
the judicial position on platform leveraging and the way in which it has developed is identified 
and analysed. By comparing the key elements of conduct assessment in the selected case-law and 
the relevant academic literature, the interpretative differences are identified in respect of 
externalities between the markets. Furthermore, the dissertation then focusses on selected cases 
from the recent decisional practice of the European Commission (Commission) which fit the model 
of the research question as closely as possible. Luckily, the two recent and most discussed 
decisions of the Commission, namely Google (Shopping)9 and Google (Android)10 (Decisions) 
                                                 
9 Case AT.39740 (Google Search (Shopping)), Commission Decision of 27 June 2017 [hereinafter Google (Shopping)]. 
10  Case AT.40099 Google (Android) [hereinafter Google (Android)]. See European Commission, 'Antitrust: 
Commission Fines Google €4.34 Billion For Illegal Practices Regarding Android Mobile Devices To Strengthen 
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provide a perfect illustration for the suggested analysis. The main methodological approach can 
be briefly described as follows. The two Decisions will be evaluated in the light of the settled case 
law. The case law in its turn will be compared with the relevant theoretical findings in economic 
and legal literature. The comparison will help to isolate the ideas and solutions that have been 
offered in academic literature but absent in the case law. Introduction of those elements into the 
logic of the Commission Decisions will provide an answer to the research question. 
The present research is predominantly monodisciplinary. It will be based on critical, qualitative 
analysis of legal materials supporting the formulated hypothesis performed in a legalistic manner. 
Three types of sources will be analysed, namely academic literature, case law and decisional 
practice of the Commission. A literal interpretation of these sources will provide the primary and 
secondary data necessary to answer the research question. The secondary data will include the 
facts of the cases, statistics, and data commented upon in academic writing. The primary data 
concerns the manner in which the law has been interpreted, and how the facts were evaluated.  
When a mere literal interpretation of a source proves insufficient, logical analysis will help to 
separate the argumentation or theories developed in a source into constituent elements. Later, such 
elements can be compared and weighed against each other. The general comparison method serves 
to identify different approaches to similar facts expressed at various levels of legal interpretation 
of the platform leveraging phenomenon. It also helps to define the key elements such as recourse 
to externalities, present in one source and omitted in another. Comparison of primary data will be 
used to identify the motives behind a particular approach. At this point, a hypothetical experiment 
can be conducted. The selected decisional practice will be analysed in the light of academic 
findings not incorporated in the relevant case law. At the same time, the original argumentative 
thread and logic of each decision will be preserved by using the method of analogy. The outcome 
of the experiment will be obtained through the deductive method. After a final comparison of the 
outcomes, a conclusion will be presented. 
  
                                                 
Dominance Of Google's Search Engine' (2018) <http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-18-4581_en.htm> accessed 




1.3 Scope and structure 
The scope of the research is limited to the European Union’s legal framework. Occasionally 
references to national case law, legislation, and regulation in Europe and the US will be made for 
illustrative purposes. 
The dissertation is divided into five chapters including the introduction (chapter 1) and conclusion 
(chapter 5). Chapters two and three summarise and analyse the relevant materials, striving to focus 
and compare the main ideas on platforms and leveraging developed by different types of sources. 
The purpose of these chapters is to create a system of coordinates framing and providing the 
measure to the actions of enforcement agencies and court decision. As it logically follows, the role 
of chapter four is to demonstrate the place of the selected decisional practice on the scale through 
an analytical experiment. Each chapter represents one step on the way to answering the research 
question. 
In chapter two, a review of the relevant academic literature will be conducted in order to summarise 
the important factors in respect to how platforms and their multisided nature operate. 
In chapter three the concept of leveraging and its elements and legal qualification are introduced. 
Leveraging practices falling outside of the reach of competition law in its current state are 
identified.  Various solutions to the formulated problem will be outlined. In this chapter, the 
relevant case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union (the Court) will be reviewed and 
the judicial interpretation of leveraging will be analysed.  The chapter will demonstrate that the 
case law does not resort to an in-depth analysis of correlations between the markets neither it 
distinguishes between its types. Academic commentators, on the contrary, insist that connections 
and externalities between the markets should be studied unless there are significant reasons to do 
otherwise.11  
In chapter four the intersection of the two concepts is discussed. An explanation will be provided 
as to why platforms are particularly prone to leveraging and how leveraging can be an integral part 
of a legitimate advertisement-based monetization strategy in the modern digital economy. The 
chapter will analyse the recent decisional practice of the Commission in Google (Shopping) and 
in Google (Android) since it is submitted that a comparison of these cases provides an excellent 
                                                 




opportunity to demonstrate the crucial role of externalities in competition law enforcement in the 
context of leveraging. The two cases have very similar facts concerning an extension of a dominant 
position from one market to another while in the manner of the preceding case law neither of them 
pays significant attention to externalities between the markets. Preserving the narrative of the 
Commission the element of externalities will be introduced into the analysis in order to see how it 
affects the outcome. In the concluding section of the chapter, the two outcomes will be compared, 
and the result will be summarised demonstrating the link between the research question and the 
question of competition on the merit.  




Chapter II.   THE CONCEPT OF PLATFORMS 
2.1. The concept 
There is no agreement on the definition of a platform in academic literature.12 Among many 
attempts to provide a definition, several deserve particular attention.  Evans (2003) used the 
existence of externalities between customer groups as the test for identifying a platform.13 Rochet 
and Tirole (2006) formulated an alternative approach and used the ability of cross-platform price 
structure to regulate overall transaction volume as an indicator of platforms.14 Hagiu and Wright 
(2011) emphasized the role of the mediator between customer groups as a crucial element defining 
a platform. They specified that simple resellers merely facilitating the interaction stay outside of 
the scope of the concept.15  
It can be observed that the three definitions complement each other rather than substitute. They 
represent a sequential reflection of discoveries made in economics, law and strategic management 
in respect of essential aspects of a platform phenomenon. Emerging theories of platforms were 
known to take advantage of previous achievements mainly in two research areas. Those areas were 
the analysis of complementary or clustering market behaviour and optimization of pricing 
strategies for related products.16 The first group of studies explains the meaning and implications 
of externalities that appear within networks. Those studies inspired the approach to platforms in 
Evans (2003).17 The second group analyzed effects of cross-subsidization among related markets 
and was used by Rochet and Tirole (2006).18 Later Hagiu and Wright (2011) acknowledging the 
previous major findings defined multisidedness as a matter of degree.19 The present chapter will 
resume the key theoretical findings in respect of platforms features, classifications and antitrust 
implications through the prism of the three mentioned approaches.   
                                                 
12  Michael Katz and Jonathan Sallet, 'Multisided Platforms And Antitrust Enforcement' (2018) 127 The Yale Law 
Journal 2142. 
13 David S. Evans, 'The Antitrust Economics Of Two-Sided Markets' (2003) 20 Yale Journal on Regulation 325. 
14 Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, 'Two-Sided Markets: A Progress Report' (2006) 37 The RAND Journal of 
Economics 645. 
15  Andrei Hagiu and Julian Wright, 'Multi-Sided Platforms' [2015] SSRN Electronic Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2794582> accessed 13 August 2018. 
16A. V. Banerjee, 'A Simple Model Of Herd Behavior' (1992) 107 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 797. 
17 Evans (n 12). 
18 Rochet and Tirole (n 14). 
19 Hagiu and Wright (n 15). 
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2.2. Network effects 
Network effects are responsible for special abilities and extra efficiencies available to platforms. 
This sub-section will introduce the concept of network effects in the light of the relevant research 
literature and present its most important classifications.  
2.2.1. Research on network effects 
The studies on clustering or complementary behaviour tried to explain behavioral patterns 
common for vaccination, bank runs, systemic risk, beauty contests, and analysts herding.20 Within 
this field of studies Katz and Shapiro (1985)21, Farrel and Saloner (1985)22, Arthur (1989)23  
analysed the process of resources allocation in innovative industries. In the same vein, Karni and 
Schmeidler (1990) studied the reasons for rising and fall of fashion tendencies.24 The studies have 
shown that often activities were more beneficial for individuals or companies when their peers 
were involved in a related activity.25 This finding constituted a foundation of further studies on 
externalities appearing within a network also known as network effects. Studies on complementary 
behaviour have shown that network effects are a powerful factor in shaping market relationships.26 
Strong network effects can cause a market being “trapped” in an obsolete or inferior standard or 
tendency. Banerjee (1992)27 in his work on "herd behaviour" demonstrated that network effects 
can persist despite being harmful to customers welfare due to informational asymmetry.28 
A decade later the key theoretical studies on platforms agreed that network externalities were more 
than informational asymmetry effect, they were the key to the understanding of behavioral features 
                                                 
20  Michael L. Katz and Carl Shapiro, 'Network Externalities, Competition, And Compatibility' (1985) 75 The 
American Economic Review 424. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner, 'Standardization, Compatibility, And Innovation' (1985) 16 The RAND Journal 
of Economics 70. 
23 W. Brian Arthur, 'Competing Technologies, Increasing Returns, And Lock-In By Historical Events' (1989) 99 The 
Economic Journal 116. 
24 Edi Karni and David Schmeidler, 'Fixed Preferences And Changing Tastes' (1990) 80 American Economic Review 
262. 
25 Ibid, supra notes 11-13.   
26 Ibid. 
27 A. V. Banerjee, 'A Simple Model Of Herd Behavior' (1992) 107 The Quarterly Journal of Economics 797. 
28 Ibid. According to the study, a customer would observe the peers' choices and assume that they were justified by 
information she does not possess. That would induce her to repeat the choice of the majority rather than choose based 
on her own consideration. 
13 
 
not well explained by the standard economics of the firm.29  Parker and Van Alstyne (2000) 
pictured network effects as a perceivable interdependence in demand within networks consisting 
of one or several customer groups.30 Following these works, it was widely accepted that a network 
could carry a separate value for its users. According to the new understanding, the demand 
expressed by one group depended not just on quality and price but also on the amount and quality 
of users within the same or another customer group.31 This represented network effects as a 
quantifiable input in the final product. Gandal, Kende, and Rob (2000) measured network 
externalities in the CD industry.32 They discovered that a 10% increase in software titles would 
have the same effect on demand for hardware products as a 5% drop in their price.33 Finally, 
analysis of network effects’ type and magnitude could provide a clearer perspective on the way in 
which platforms operated. 
2.2.2. Types of network effects 
Most theoretical studies distinguish between direct and indirect network effects.34 Direct effects 
can be defined as externalities imposed by the members of one customer group on their peers. 
Indirect network effects can be defined as externalities imposed by one customer group onto 
another. The classic example of a platform relying on direct network effects is fax technology. The 
bigger the pool of its users the more attractive it is for the new members35. Indirect network effects 
lie in the foundation of advertising-based businesses. The classic example is newspapers that strive 
to accommodate readers, writers, and advertisers by using inter-group externalities.36  
                                                 
29 Bernard Caillaud and Bruno Jullien, 'Chicken & Egg: Competition Among Intermediation Service Providers' (2003) 
34 The RAND Journal of Economics 309. Mark Armstrong, 'Competition In Two-Sided Markets' (2006) 37 The 
RAND Journal of Economics 668. Evans (n 12). Rochet and Tirole (n 13). 
30  Geoffrey Parker and Marshall W. Van Alstyne, 'Information Complements, Substitutes, And Strategic Product 
Design' [2000] SSRN Electronic Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=249585> accessed 5 
August 2018. 
31 Richard Schmalensee and David S. Evans, 'The Industrial Organization Of Markets With Two-Sided Platforms' 
(2007) 3 Competition Policy International 151. 
32 Neil Gandal, Michael Kende, and Rafael Rob, 'The Dynamics Of Technological Adoption In Hardware/Software 
Systems: The Case Of Compact Disc Players' (2000) 31 The RAND Journal of Economics 43. 
33 Ibid. 
34 See for example Schmalensee and Evans (n 30). Erik Hovenkamp, 'Antitrust Policy For Two-Sided Markets' [2018] 
SSRN Electronic Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3121481> accessed 26 July 2018. 
35 Julian Wright, 'One-Sided Logic In Two-Sided Markets' (2004) 3 Review of Network Economics 44. 
36 Ibid. Advertisers value collaboration with platforms because they provide them with the audience. An increase of 
the audience causes growth in demand among advertisers due to positive indirect network effects. Readers on the other 
side usually buy newspapers because they value their journalistic component. Meanwhile, they might have negative, 
neutral or sometimes positive fillings towards advertising. 
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Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006)37 and Armstrong (2006)38 distinguished between membership and 
participation network effects. The former arises from joining a platform like in case of pre-
installation of certain features on a mobile device, while the latter arises from the act of use such 
as paying by card or sending a query to a search engine. Network effects can be positive as well 
as negative or exhibit different magnitude.39 Rysman (2004) studied the market for yellow pages 
and has found significant positive cross-network effects between advertisers and readers.40 Wilbur 
(2008) on the contrary, has found that an increase in an advertisement on TV decreases the 
audience due to negative cross-network effect.41  This demonstrated that advertisers always value 
users, however, the value that users place on advertisers has to be estimated on a case-by-case 
basis.42 Sriram et al. (2014) found that even when cross-network effects are reciprocal they really 
match in magnitude.43 Reciprocal positive indirect network effects are common for transactional 
platforms that bring two parties together and serve as an intermediary in the transaction. Non-
reciprocal positive indirect network effects are common for non-transactional platforms such as 
search engines. In this case, the transaction between the parties lies outside of the scope of the 
platform intermediation services. Among all classification of network effects, 44  the three 
mentioned above are fundamental for the understanding of platform inner mechanics.  
2.3. Cross-subsidization 
It is hard to underestimate the importance of network effects for platforms. Meanwhile, the size of 
the benefit platforms can internalize due to the use of network effects depends on cross-
                                                 
37  Jean-Charles Rochet and Jean Tirole, 'Platform Competition In Two-Sided Markets' (2003) 1 Journal of the 
European Economic Association 990. 
38 Mark Armstrong, 'Competition In Two-Sided Markets' (2006) 37 The RAND Journal of Economics 668. 
39 Matthew T. Clements, 'Direct And Indirect Network Effects: Are They Equivalent?' [2002] SSRN Electronic 
Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=313928> accessed 5 March 2018. 
40 Marc Rysman, 'Competition Between Networks: A Study Of The Market For Yellow Pages' (2004) 71 The Review 
of Economic Studies 483. 
41 Kenneth C. Wilbur, 'A Two-Sided, Empirical Model Of Television Advertising And Viewing Markets' (2008) 27 
Marketing Science 356. 
42 Ibid. Rysmon (29). See also Harikesh Nair, Pradeep Chintagunta, and Jean-Pierre Dubé, 'Empirical Analysis Of 
Indirect Network Effects In The Market For Personal Digital Assistants' (2004) 2 Quantitative Marketing and 
Economics 23. Daniel A. Ackerberg and Gautam Gowrisankaran, 'Quantifying Equilibrium Network Externalities In 
The ACH Banking Industry' (2006) 37 The RAND Journal of Economics 738. 
43 In online consumer-to-consumer platforms, an installed base of sellers was shown to have a much larger effect on 
the growth of buyers than vice versa. See S. Sriram and others, 'Platforms: A Multiplicity Of Research Opportunities' 
(2014) 26 Marketing Letters 141. 
44 For more classifications see Richard Schmalensee and David S. Evans, 'Markets With Two-Sided Platforms' [2008] 
SSRN Electronic Journal <http://Markets with Two-Sided Platforms> accessed 5 August 2018. 
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subsidization options available within the network. The present sub-section talks about the special 
role of cross-subsidization technique in platforms. On the one side, it is a powerful commercial 
instrument capable of providing flexibility and efficiency unavailable otherwise, on the other, 
cross-subsidization reduces transparency and provides additional opportunities for abuse.   
2.3.1. Price structure 
The ability of integrated companies to cross-subsidize between customer groups started to attract 
academic attention long before the emerging of a platform concept. Baxter (1983) has built one of 
the first theoretical models describing the multi-sided nature of a payment card network.45 Parker 
and Van Alstyne (2005) have found that complementary products given away for free could 
increase overall profit.46  Armstrong (2006) studied rationales behind cross-subsidizing one side 
of the market at the expense of the other and argued that such practices can enhance not just 
companies’ gains but also consumer welfare.47 Building on the previous findings Rochet and 
Tirole (2003) drew a first comprehensive model of platform competition on two-sided markets 
joining the ideas on cross-platform externalities and cross-subsidization.48 They demonstrated that 
indirect network effects are an indicator of multi-sided markets. In order to reach maximum 
transaction volume players active on such markets had to adjust not only the price level but also a 
cross-platform price structure.49 With the example of bank cards interchange fees, Klein et al. 
(2006) demonstrated that undistorted competition would force platforms to distribute the payment 
burden among the customer groups in the most efficient manner.50 That creates a situation in which 
one platform side is always subsidized by another.51 As a result, only total and not relative prices 
can be regarded as to indicate exercise of market power.52   
                                                 
45 William F. Baxter, 'Bank Interchange Of Transactional Paper: Legal And Economic Perspectives' (1983) 26 The 
Journal of Law and Economics 541.   
46 Geoffrey G. Parker and Marshall W. Van Alstyne, 'Two-Sided Network Effects: A Theory Of Information Product 
Design' (2005) 51 Management Science 1494. 
47 Armstrong (n 38). 
48 Rochet and Tirole (n 14). 
49 Ibid. 
50 Platforms normally would charge more to the customer group with lower price sensitivity. See Benjamin Klein and 
others, 'Competition In Two-Sided Markets: The Antitrust Economics Of Payment Card Interchange Fees' (2006) 73 
Antitrust Law Journal 571.  
51 Empirical research showing that the average cost of a printed copy of a newspaper is higher than the average price 
at which it is offered to users. Jose M. Vidal-Sanz and Mercedes Esteban-Bravo, 'A Nonlinear Product Differentiation 
Model À La Cournot: A New Look To The Newspapers Industry' [2013] DEE - Working Papers. Business Economics. 
<https://ideas.repec.org/p/cte/wbrepe/wb132002.html> accessed 8 August 2018. 
52 Klein et al. (n 50). 
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This finding had important implications for competition law enforcement since it requires to 
change the way in which price-cost tests are applied 53 More generally, they had to develop a new 
approach towards competition law enforcement that would account to a possibility of pro-
competitive cross-subsidization.54 
2.3.2. Zero-price trade 
In response to competitive pressure toward the optimal price structure,55 platforms can choose to 
set a price for one side at zero. That would fully place the payment burden on the other side.56  
This strategy is widely employed by online companies since it allows them to create a sufficient 
customer base early in companies’ life.57  Its popularity induced the discussion of whether zero-
price trade could and should be a subject of antitrust scrutiny.  
2.3.2.1. Zero-price trade and the scope of competition law 
Historically, competition law enforcement was methodologically grounded in the price theory.58 
Its logic suggested that there could be no market for free goods as well as no consumer harm.59 As 
a consequence, the antitrust analysis did not have the means to overcome the positive price bias 
despite the evidence that goods and services offered to consumers for free can significantly affect 
competition and consumer welfare.60 In the course of debate large online companies offering 
goods free of charge opposed enforcement agencies on many levels. Affected by the positive price 
                                                 
53 For the summary on the application of competition law tools in the context of platforms see Bundeskartellamt, 
'Working Paper Market Power Of Platforms And Networks' (BKartA 2016) 
<https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Berichte/Think-Tank-Bericht-
Langfassung.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=2> accessed 29 August 2018. See also OECD, 'Rethinking Antitrust 
Tools For Multi-Sided Platforms (2018).' Supra note 7. 
54  John M. Newman, 'Antitrust In Zero-Price Markets: Applications' [2015] SSRN Electronic Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2681304> accessed 8 August 2018. 
55 Schmalensee and Evans (n 31). 
56 Kai Chen and Edison T. Tse, 'Dynamic Platform Competition In Two-Sided Markets' [2008] SSRN Electronic 
Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1095124> accessed 8 August 2018. 
57 Sampsa Ruutu, Thomas Casey and Ville Kotovirta, 'Development And Competition Of Digital Service Platforms: 
A System Dynamics Approach' (2017) 117 Technological Forecasting and Social Change 119. 
58 For a price theory as a microeconomic principle that allowed to determine the appropriate price point for goods and 
services using the concept of supply and demand. See Léon Walras, Elements Of Pure Economics, Or, The Theory 
Of Social Wealth (2nd edn, American Economic Association and the Royal Economic Society by Allen and Unwin 
1954). 
59 Newman (n 54). 
60 See for example Parker and Van Alstyne (n 46). David S. Evans, 'Antitrust Economics Of Free' [2011] SSRN 
Electronic Journal <https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1813193> accessed 4 August 2018. 
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bias domestic courts initially supported the position of online companies.61 Trying to create a 
friendly academic environment and maybe affect the approach of foreign courts the latter spent 
significant financial resources on favorable research.62 Nowadays although some maintain that 
there can be no markets of free goods,63 the majority of the academic commentators seems to agree 
that pricing at zero does not preclude competition law scrutiny.64 Newman (2014) explains the 
confusion around zero-priced goods and services by the misleading rhetoric65  and erroneous 
labeling of such goods and services as “free”. 66  To define the real cost of so-called free goods 
and services he relies on the taxonomy of Sherman and Clayton acts,67 that identify the scope of 
the US antitrust law through the concepts of “trade” and “commerce”.68 The idea of two-way 
exchange is fundamental for economic gains constituting the essential element of the latter 
concepts. The fact of exchange does not depend on the monetary form of consideration. Instead, 
the latter can be provided in the form of information or attention. When a customer shares her 
information or attention in exchange for something she wants, she incurs "market-signalling" type 
of costs. As opposed to "non-market-signalling", such costs are incurred in the course of “trade” 
or “commerce” and consequently fall in the scope of antitrust law.69 
In the EU legal system, the concept of undertaking determines ‘the categories of actors to which 
the competition rules apply’.70 According to the settled case law, the concept of undertaking 
“encompasses every entity engaged in economic activity, regardless of the legal status of the entity 
                                                 
61  See for example Stephen Jay Photography, Ltd. v. Olan Mills, Inc., 903 F.2d 988, 991 (4th Cir. 1990).); 
Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF(RS), 2007 WL 831806 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007). 
62 Google’s Academic Influence In Europe' (Politico.eu, 2018) <https://www.politico.eu/wp-
content/uploads/2018/03/GTP-European-Google-Academics-Final.pdf> accessed 13 August 2018. 
63 Christian Kersting and Sebastian Dworschak, 'Does Google Hold A Dominant Market Position? – Addressing The 
(Minor) Significance Of High Online User Shares' [2014] SSRN Electronic Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2495300> accessed 4 August 2018. See also James D. Ratliff 
and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 'Is There A Market For Organic Search Engine Results And Can Their Manipulation Give 
Rise To Antitrust Liability?' (2014) 10 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 517. 
64 See for example John M. Newman, 'Antitrust In Zero-Price Markets: Foundations' [2014] SSRN Electronic Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474874> accessed 3 August 2018. For the summary of 
academic opinions on the matter see OECD, 'Rethinking Antitrust Tools For Multi-Sided Platforms.' (2018) Supra 
note 7. 
65 Herbert Hovenkamp, 'Rhetoric And Skepticism In Antitrust Argument' (1986) 84 Michigan Law Review 1721. 
66  John M. Newman, 'Antitrust In Zero-Price Markets: Foundations' [2014] SSRN Electronic Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2474874> accessed 3 August 2018. 
67The Sherman Antitrust Act passed in 1890 (15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7) and amended by the Clayton Act in 1914 (15 U.S.C. 
§ 12-27) [hereinafter The Sherman Act]. 
68 Newman (n 66). 
69 Ibid. 
70  Opinion of Advocate General Jacobs, Case C-67/96 Albany International BV(Albany) v Stichting 
Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] ECLI:EU:C:1999:28 [1-5751], para. 206.  
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and the way in which it is financed”.71 The central concept of economic activity in its turn is 
defined broadly in the relevant case law72 as encompassing any activity concerning the offering of 
goods and services on the market73 that, in principle, could be carried out by a private undertaking 
in order to make profits.74 According to the case law non-economic activities excluded from the 
scope of Art. 101, 102 TFEU are defined as built on "the principle of solidarity" and "subject to 
the supervision of the State”.75 The fact that a good or service was provided in exchange for a 
remuneration does not affect the legal classification of such activity.76 
A close reading reveals that in the definition of its scope EU competition law relies more on the 
substantive characteristics of activity such as whether it can be profitable.77 Whereas the US 
antitrust law is focused on the form the activity is taking and whether there is an element of 
exchange in it. As a consequence, the interpretation of economic activity concept developed by 
the EU case law allowed to avoid major confusion in respect of free-of-charge goods and services.  
The US antitrust agencies on the other side had to demonstrate the presence of the exchange 
element in zero-price trade in order to establish their competence over the issue. They found a 
solution in interpreting consumers’ information and attention as a new type of currency offering 
new insight on platforms.78 
 
                                                 
71  Case C-67/96, Albany International BV(Albany) v Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds Textielindustrie [1999] 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:430, para. 77. Case C-41/90 Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH [1991] ECR I-1979 
ECLI:EU:C:1991:161, para. 21. 
72 Okeoghene Odudu, 'The Boundaries Of EC Competition Law: The Scope Of Article 81' [2006] Oxford University 
Press 45. 
73 See Case C-475/99, Firma Ambulanz Glöckner v Landkreis Südwestpfalz [2001] ECLI:EU:C:2001:577 [hereinafter 
Ambulanz], para. 19. Case C-35/96 Commission of the European Communities v Italian Republic [1998] 
ECLI:EU:C:1998:303 para. 36. Case C-205/03 P, Federación Española de Empresas de Tecnología Sanitaria (FENIN) 
v Commission of the European Communities [2006] ECLI:EU:C:2006:453, para 25.  
74 Supra note 70, para. 311. Cases C-180-184/98 Pavel Pavlov and Others v Stichting Pensioenfonds Medische 
Specialisten [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:151, para 201.  
75 Case C-350/07, Kattner Stahlbau GmbH v Maschinenbau- und Metall- Berufsgenossenschaft [2009] 
ECLI:EU:C:2009:127, paras. 42-43. Case C-437/09, AG2R Prévoyance v Beaudout Père et Fils SARL [2011] 
ECLI:EU:C:2011:112, paras. 53-65. 
76 Case C-138/11 Compass-Datenbank GmbH v Republik Österreich [2012] ECLI:EU:C:2012:449, para 42.  
77 On why the provision of public goods and services cannot be profitable see Odudu (n 72). 
78  Cotton Delo, 'Here's My Personal Data, Marketers. What Do I Get For It?' (Adage.com, 2018) 
<http://adage.com/article/digital/web-data-startups-bank-consumers-controlling-data/231208/> accessed 13 August 
2018. Nathan Newman, 'You're Not Google's Customer -- You're The Product: Antitrust In A Web 2.0 World' 
(HuffPost, 2018) <https://www.huffingtonpost.com/nathan-newman/youre-not-googles-custome_b_841599.html> 
accessed 10 August 2018. 
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2.3.2.1.1. Information costs 
Consumer data and information are valuable and tradable goods that can generate profit in many 
ways.79 Modern technological and analytical capacities allow to collect and structure big volumes 
of diverse consumer data at a high speed80 opening new opportunities for its commercial use.  The 
role of data in economic activities is highly significant. It can be used to explore new business 
opportunities, create targeted offers, predict consumers shopping patterns and spending capacity.81 
On the one side, access to consumers’ information allows improving products and services and 
raising economic efficiency.82 On the other side, collection and use of consumers’ data raise 
numerous concerns in the field of privacy and data protection.83 Ultimately, the risks connected 
with the latter define the true cost of the consideration paid by the consumer in exchange for a free 
good or service.84  
2.3.2.1.2. Attention costs 
Although consumer data can be marketed on its own, practically in most cases its value is derived 
from the value that can be created through the consumers’ attention gained with the help of such 
data.85 Not many people are truly capable of multitasking. As a result, they can devote their 
                                                 
79 On the ways of marketing of consumer data see Federal Trade Commission, 'Data Brokers: A Call For Transparency 
And Accountability: A Report Of The Federal Trade Commission' (2014) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-call-transparency-accountability-report-federal-
trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf> accessed 13 August 2018. 
80 Big data is often associated with the triple "V" monogram standing for its main characteristics: Velocity, Variety,  
and Volume. See Han Hu and others, 'Toward Scalable Systems For Big Data Analytics: A Technology Tutorial' 
(2014) 2 IEEE Access 652. 
81 See for example Joint Report of the French Competition Authority (Autorité de la concurrence) and the German 
Competition Authority (Bundeskartellamt) Autorité de la concurrence and Bundeskartellamt, 'Competition Law And 
Data' (2018) <http://www.autoritedelaconcurrence.fr/doc/reportcompetitionlawanddatafinal.pdf> accessed 13 August 
2018. See also The Competition and Markets Authority (CMA), 'The Commercial Use Of Consumer Data' (2015) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/435817/The_co
mmercial_use_of_consumer_data.pdf> accessed 1 September 2018. 
82 Economic research has shown that access to consumer information may intensify competition. See for example 
Rosa-Branca Esteves, 'Pricing With Customer Recognition' (2010) 28 International Journal of Industrial Organization 
669. Rosa-Branca Esteves, 'Price Discrimination With Private And Imperfect Information' (2014) 116 The 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 766. 
83  'Little Brother' (The Economist, 2014) <https://www.economist.com/special-report/2014/09/11/little-brother> 
accessed 4 September 2018. Charles Duhigg, 'How Companies Learn Your Secrets' (Nytimes.com, 2018) 
<https://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html> accessed 4 September 2018. 
84 John Hagel III and Jeffrey F. Rayport, 'The Coming Battle For Customer Information' (Harvard Business Review, 
2018) <https://hbr.org/1997/01/the-coming-battle-for-customer-information> accessed 13 August 2018. 
85  Brad J. Sagarin and others, 'Bartering Our Attention: The Distraction And Persuasion Effects Of On-Line 
Advertisements.' (2014) 8 Cognitive Technology 4. 
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attention to one thing at a time.86 In the online economy companies vigorously compete for this 
limited resource of attention also known as ‘traffic’.87 It is well known that like data, traffic is a 
tradable good and an important input in most business models.88 Meanwhile, platforms have taken 
the utility of online traffic on a new level. The possibility of cross-subsidization allows them to 
offer valuable and costly goods and services to the public free of charge generating an 
extraordinary amount of traffic that can be sold at a profit across the platform.89 Companies that 
buy traffic usually pay for advertisement placement on the platform’s website. According to 
Newman (2014), all advertising can be divided into three categories: unsolicited, directly solicited 
and indirectly solicited.90 Bombarded with unsolicited advertising a consumer spends her attention 
and receives nothing, but annoyance91, therefore, she incurs non-market-signalling costs. Since 
there is no element of exchange, such relationships fall outside of the scope of competition law. 
Two other cases fall within such scope. In the case of directly solicited advertising the consumer 
receives important information and incurs market-signalling costs in exchange for her attention 
and information. In the case of indirectly solicited advertising the consumer pays consideration by 
watching the advertising in exchange for unrelated good or service that is given to her free of 
ёcharge.92 
What Newman (2014) describes as indirectly solicited advertising represents a tying practice. In 
that setup the tying product is a positively valued good or service that is given away free of charge 
while the tied product is advertising that has zero value for the consumer on its own but is valued 
negatively when information and attention costs are taken in account. Although some users might 
                                                 
86 Tom Chatfield, 'The Attention Economy' (Aeon, 2013) <https://aeon.co/essays/does-each-click-of-attention-cost-a-
bit-of-ourselves> accessed 14 August 2018. 
87 D. S. Evans, 'Attention Rivalry Among Online Platforms' (2013) 9 Journal of Competition Law and Economics. 
313. 
88 US Federal Trade Commission (n 79). 
89 See section 2.3.1. 
90 Newman (n 66). 
91 WhatsApp wrote in 2012 before it was taken over by Facebook:  “Advertising isn't just the disruption of aesthetics, 
the insults to your intelligence and the interruption of your train of thought”. See 'Whatsapp Messaging App Applies 
New Way That Will Connect Users And Ad’S Companies On Facebook – Super Tech World' (Supertechinfo.net, 
2018) <http://supertechinfo.net/2018/08/01/whatsapp-messaging-app-applies-new-way-that-will-connect-users-and-




welcome tied advertising their amount, as a rule, is insignificant consequently those users are not 
taken into account by the pricing model.93 
2.3.3. Platforms’ dynamics 
The ability to cross-subsidize significantly affects the dynamics of platforms growth and 
development.94 As a rule, a customer will only engage in a transaction if in the aftermath her 
private benefits exceed her cost. Cross-subsidization platforms can lift the payment burden from 
price sensitive and volatile consumer groups increasing the attractiveness of the product or service 
to them. This strategy allows for creating a significant customer base in short terms. Due to direct 
network effects with each new user the value of the platform membership increases, so does the 
speed of its growth.95 However, the correlation between the customer base size and the platform’s 
growth speed is not linear. For each platform, there is a certain number of users after which its 
growth accelerates. This number is known as a critical mass.96 Being a function of a network 
characteristics critical mass is different for every platform. Meanwhile, in a similar manner for 
each platform, it marks the point in its development when the adoption of innovation becomes 
self-sustaining.97 That finding explains platforms’ tendency to tipping and constitutes the base of 
‘the winner takes all’ theory98. According to the latter theory, after a platform obtains a critical 
user mass it becomes a natural monopoly due to barriers to entry and growth raised by network 
effects and economies of scale.99  
                                                 
93 On platform’s pricing strategies for heterogeneous users such as the ones who welcome advertising and the ones 
who do not see E. Glen Weyl, 'A Price Theory Of Multi-Sided Platforms' (2010) 100 American Economic Review 
1642. 
94 Michael L Katz and Carl Shapiro, 'Systems Competition And Network Effects' (1994) 8 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives 93. 
95 Ibid.  
96 Yannis J. Bakos and Chris F. Kemerer, 'Recent Applications Of Economic Theory In Information Technology 
Research' (1992) 8 Decision Support Systems 365. Francesco Castelli and Claudio Leporelli, 'Critical Mass Of Users 
Versus Critical Mass Of Services In A Multiproduct Information Service System' (1993) 5 Information Economics 
and Policy 331. 
97 For the definition of a critical mass of users see Alwin Mahler and Everett M. Rogers, 'The Diffusion Of Interactive 
Communication Innovations And The Critical Mass: The Adoption Of Telecommunications Services By German 
Banks' (1999) 23 Telecommunications Policy 719. 
98  David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, 'Some Economic Aspects Of Antitrust Analysis In Dynamically 
Competitive Industries' (2002) 2 Innovation Policy and the Economy 1. 
99 Antonio Capobianco and Anita Nyeso, 'Challenges For Competition Law Enforcement And Policy In The Digital 
Economy' (2017) 9 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 19. 
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Although ‘the winner takes all’ scenario is very common, it is still not ubiquitous.100 Meanwhile, 
network effects can cause platforms not just to dominate the market but also to spiral down. 
Building on that fact the critics of the theory assigns the main role in platforms’ growth dynamic 
to the quality of the product or service rather than to the installed base including consumer 
network.101 In each case, the question of whether tipping will occur, or can several monopolies 
coexist in equilibrium depends on characters of the market such as multi-homing.102  
2.3.4. Multi-homing 
Consumers are said to multi-home when they receive similar goods or services from different 
providers.103 Multi-homing reduces market power and increases consumer welfare104 in all kinds 
of markets.  
In a market where multi-homing is not possible in order to appreciate a new product or service, a 
consumer needs to change the provider. This imposes one-time switching costs which cover 
uncertainty, search and learning costs in respect of the new product, costs of initiating relationships 
with a new provider, actual cost of a new product and its complements. It also often involves the 
loss of investments, benefits, and networks associated with the former provider.105 These costs 
make consumers reluctant to change a provider unless the benefit offered by a new entrant 
compensates for it.106 Importantly, a new entrant might also need to provide additional benefits to 
account for consumers’ loss aversion.107 Therefore, multi-homing prevents the consumer from 
                                                 
100 For example, see 'Share Of Search Queries Handled By Leading U.S. Search Engine Providers As Of October 
2018' (Statista, 2018) <https://www.statista.com/statistics/267161/market-share-of-search-engines-in-the-united-
states/> accessed 1 August 2018. 
101 David S. Evans and Richard Schmalensee, 'Why Winner-Takes-All Thinking Doesn’T Apply To The Platform 
Economy' (Harvard Business Review, 2016) <https://hbr.org/2016/05/why-winner-takes-all-thinking-doesnt-apply-
to-silicon-valley> accessed 1 August 2018. 
102 Mingchun Sun and Edison T. Tse, 'When Does The Winner Take All In Two-Sided Markets?' (2007) 6 Review of 
Network Economics 16. Roberto Roson, 'Two-Sided Markets: A Tentative Survey' (2005) 4 Review of Network 
Economics 142. 
103 Armstrong (n 38). 
104  Ibid. Schmalensee and Evans (n 31). 
105 Thomas A. Burnham, Judy K. Frels and Vijay Mahajan, 'Consumer Switching Costs: A Typology, Antecedents, 
And Consequences' (2003) 31 Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 109. 
106 On markets for goods and services marketed free of charge new entrants are limited to quality competition only. 
Although quality must be interpreted in a broad sense. See Michal S. Gal and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 'The Hidden Costs 
Of Free Goods: Implications For Antitrust Enforcement' (2016) 80 Antitrust Law Journal 521. On tying as a way to 
overcome non-negative price competition see Choi, Jay Pil, and Doh-Shin Jeon. "A Leverage Theory of Tying in 
Two-Sided Markets." (2016). Unpublished manuscript. 
107 Daniel Kahneman and Amos N. Tversky, 'Choices, Values, And Frames.' (1984) 39 American Psychologist 341. 
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being locked-in and lowering barriers to entry. However, this does not work in the same way if 
consumers multi-home in response to product differentiation. 108  The latter indicates that the 
products are not in direct competition. 109  For example, some commentators outline barrier-
reducing role of multi-homing on markets for complements products110 or advertising111 where 
providers of the later goods multi-home between platforms in order to increase their consumer 
base. Merchants in such situation need to multi-home because consumers on the other side of the 
platform mainly single-home creating a setup known as ‘competitive bottle-neck.112 In a setup like 
this, the products of two platforms offering access to different unique single-homing sets of users 
can be seen as complements rather than substitutes. In that case, multi-homing is not an alternative 
to switching and has no effect on barriers to entry. This aligns with Armstrong's (2006) finding 
that in a situation of the competitive bottleneck the single-homing side is normally favoured by 
the platform while the multi-homing side is more likely to be mistreated.113 Interestingly, multi-
homing of customers on both sides is often used as a first-line defence by online platforms against 
allegations on their dominance and market tipping.114 Therefore, the actual effect of multi-homing 
depends on the consumers' motives to multi-home in each particular case.  
2.3.5. Platforms as a matter of degree 
It became a common ground in the legal and economic literature that in the course of antitrust 
scrutiny externalities should be taken into account unless there are significant reasons to do 
otherwise.115 However, not any integrated structure should be treated as a platform by default. 
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Instead, multi-sidedness should be considered a matter of degree.116 It is reasonable to characterize 
an enterprise as a platform only when the effects of cross-platform externalities are strong enough 
to affect the behaviour of the customer groups.  
This approach is supported by the fact that multi-sidedness can appear spontaneously or evolve 
over time due to natural reasons.  An interesting example was provided by the United Kingdom’s 
Director General of Fair Trading.117 The case concerned two market segments for morphine sale. 
Demand for the medicine on the EU market was highly influenced by the demand on the hospital 
market. That dependence was strong enough to create an externality in the form of a perceivable 
cross-platform network effect. In order to profit from this effect, the producer of the medicine 
charged predatory prices in the hospital segment in order to weaken the effective competition on 
the market. This suggests that the list of situations where externalities should be taken into account 
is open and is not limited by advertisement-based business models.118 
2.4. Conclusion on platforms 
This chapter has provided a summary of the key academic findings on platforms and their multi-
sided nature. Based on the analysed materials, it can be assumed that the legal content of the 
platform concept is deeply rooted in economic theory studying the phenomenon of multi-sided 
markets, network effects, and cross-subsidizing. As a result, the platform concept is likely to have 
a degree of flexibility as long as those theories are in development. Currently, a term platform is 
generally understood as an undertaking that serves several customer groups at the same time, 
among which at least one imposes strong positive indirect externalities on another, usually, but not 
necessarily,119 in the form of network effects. In order to increase efficiency, platforms cross-
subsidize the externality producing group at a cost of other customer groups. This represents a 
form of merit competition that allows platforms to access externalities-based efficiencies. The 
most important classification of platforms distinguishes transactional and non-transaction types. 
So far platforms ability to access extra efficiencies through cross-subsidization is not accounted 
for by traditional competition law enforcement practices. However, this may change with the new 
                                                 
116 Michael Noel and David Evans, 'Defining Antitrust Markets When Firms Operate Two-Sided Platforms' (2005) 
2005 Columbia Business Law Review 667. See also Evans and Schmalensee (n 31). 
117 Case 1001/1/1/01 Napp Pharmaceutical Holdings Limited and Subsidiaries v Director General of Fair Trading 
[2002] CAT 1. 
118 Ibid. 
119 See section 2.4. 
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cases concerning inter and intra-platforms leveraging in the new economy bringing a closer look 





Chapter III.   LEVERAGING 
This chapter will present the concept of leveraging through a brief comparison of the US and EU 
case law.  It will also identify leveraging practices that despite best efforts of policymakers fall 
outside of EU competition law framework while nevertheless may distort competition on the 
market. For the purpose of the present dissertation, the term “leveraging” is used in the general 
sense. It refers to the extension of market power or its effects on another related market or market 
segment capable of restricting competition. Such behaviour in its turn might or might not be 
captured by the US leveraging doctrine or qualify as an abusive extension of dominance under Art. 
102 TFEU. The term is chosen due to its concise phrasing, a helpful reference to principles of 
classical mechanics and popularity among business managers themselves.120  
3.1. The concept 
Extending of market power or its effects from one market to another is a long established and fairly 
common practice that raises serious competition concerns the essence of which often goes back to 
the unresolved conflict between perfect competition and dynamic efficiency.121 To address the 
issue different legal systems adopted different strategies. The US legal system has developed the 
concept of monopoly power leveraging while the EU legal system operates with the concept of 
dominance extension122 or abusive conduct with effects on a separate market.123 In the European 
context, the term leveraging is used as a reference to a strategic behaviour aimed at dominance 
extension that combines several abusive practices. 124  Although both approaches address the 
problem, neither of them solves it. In the context of the new economy leveraging practices 
constantly increase in their diversity and intricacy. Legal development is continuously trying to 
catch up with economic advances often leaving certain types of market behaviour outside of legal 
qualification.  
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3.1.1. Origin of the concept 
In the US the term “leveraging” was coined by pre-Chicago case law concerning practices where 
a firm with market power would extend or attempt to extend such power to a related market 
effectively avoiding competition on merit.125 The US Sherman Act was adopted in 1890 to protect 
competition and limit monopolization. Section 2 of the Act prohibits behaviour that amounts to 
monopolization or attempted monopolization of a new market. 126  In order to support a 
monopolization claim, a plaintiff is required to demonstrate that a company possesses a monopoly 
power on a relevant market and that such power was acquired by means other than a “superior 
product, business acumen, or historic accident”. 127  In order to make a successful claim of 
attempted monopolization a plaintiff has to prove an intent to monopolize, predatory or 
anticompetitive conduct aimed at market monopolization and a high probability that 
monopolization will be successful.128 In both cases, the standard of proof is relatively high.129  
Leveraging, on the contrary, is not linked to a monopolization objective. Instead, it maintains an 
attainable standard of a competitive advantage obtained on the market through the use of monopoly 
power on another market.130 In Berkey Photo case leveraging was considered a separate claim 
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act. 131 The judgment rendered specific effects on the market and 
market shares irrelevant as long as some kind of advantage was obtained and therefore some degree 
of competition distortion was present. Neither did it concern the intent to monopolize the market, 
nor the probability with which such effect might occur. This made it significantly easier to prove 
an antitrust infringement. However, the judicial and academic acceptance of the leveraging 
doctrine was not universal 132  partially due to the Chicago School "single-monopoly-profit 
                                                 
125 United States v. Griffith 334 U.S. 100, 107-09 (1948), where the court finds that the “use of monopoly power, 
however lawfully acquired, to foreclose competition, to gain a competitive advantage, or to destroy a competitor, is 
unlawful.” Int'l Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 396 (1947), where the court found that tying represented an 
attempt to leverage a monopoly in one market to another. 
126 The Sherman Act, Section 2. 
127 United States v. Grinnell, 384 U.S. 563, 570-71 (1966). For discussion on the elements of monopolization claim 
see Timothy J. Muris, 'The FTC And The Law Of Monopolization' [2000] SSRN Electronic Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=235403> accessed 5 August 2018. 
128 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. United Airlines, Inc 948 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1991) [hereinafter Alaska Airlines]. Muris (n 
127). 
129 Roger D. Blair and Amanda K. Esquibel, 'Some Remarks on Monopoly Leveraging' (1995) 40 The Antitrust 
Bulletin 371. 
130 Willow A. Sheremata, 'Barriers To Innovation: A Monopoly, Network Externalities, And The Speed Of Innovation' 
(1997) 42 The Antitrust Bulletin 937. 
131 Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert, denied 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). 
132 See for example, Alaska Airlines. Fineman v. Armstrong World Industries, Inc. 980 F.2d 171 (3rd Cir. 1992). For 
the Supreme Court position in support of a separate claim see for example Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 
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theorem”133 arguing that leveraging of monopoly power was neither profitable nor possible.134 
Post-Chicago academic literature identified that the single-monopoly-profit theorem holds only in 
a narrow range of circumstances. 135  This reopened the question of the leveraging doctrine 
relevance in the modern economy in particular in the context of multi-sided digital markets.136  
Modern Antitrust law approach to leveraging is increasingly characterized as effect-based and 
shifting towards a rule of reason.137  
3.1.2. Leveraging as a prohibited strategy under Art. 102 TFEU 
The form-oriented concept of discrimination referred to in Art. 102 (c) TFEU comes near the US 
understanding of leveraging. The vein in which the concept is presented in the Treaty makes it 
look very similar to the Berkey leveraging doctrine which leaves no space for effects assessment. 
Art. 102 (c) TFEU directly prohibits discrimination or “applying dissimilar conditions to 
equivalent transactions with other trading parties, thereby placing them at a competitive 
disadvantage”. 138  However, the EU case law chose another route. The Court restated the 
requirement expressed in Section (c) in British Airways where it found that in order to be contrary 
to Art. 102 TFEU conduct needs not only to be discriminatory but also tending to distort 
competition.139 In Post Danmark I the Court has clarified that price discrimination is not an abuse 
in itself140 and in Post Danmark II it clarified that to be considered anticompetitive conduct does 
not need to be discriminatory as long as it is capable of producing an exclusionary effect.141  In 
                                                 
Inc. 504 U.S. 451 (1992). For the opposite position see for example Spectrum Sports v. McQuillan 506 U.S. 447 
(1993). 
133 Jennifer M. Clarke-Smith, 'The Development of The Monopolistic Leveraging Theory And Its Appropriate Role 
In Antitrust Law.' (2002) 52 Catholic University Law Review 179. 
134 Richard A Posner, Antitrust Law (University of Chicago Press 1976). Robert H Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (The 
Free Press 1978). 
135 See Einer R. Elhauge, 'Tying, Bundled Discounts, And the Death Of The Single Monopoly Profit Theory' (2009) 
123 Harvard Law Review 399. For the response to critique on the article see Einer R. Elhauge, 'The Failed 
Resurrection of The Single Monopoly Profit Theory' [2010] SSRN Electronic Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1551470> accessed 21 September 2018. 
136 Einer R. Elhauge, 'The Failed Resurrection of The Single Monopoly Profit Theory' [2010] SSRN Electronic Journal 
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1551470> accessed 21 September 2018. 
137 See Evans discussing the case Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2, 104 S.Ct. 1551, 80 
L.Ed. 2d 2 (1984) 86. 
138 Art. 102 (c) TFEU. 
139 Case C-95/04 P, British Airways v Commission [2007] ECLI:EU:C:2007:166 [hereinafter British Airways], para. 
144.  
140 Case C-209/10P, Post Danmark A/S v Konkurrencerådet [2012] EU:C:2012:172 [hereinafter Post Danmark I], 
para. 30. 




other words, despite its wording Art. 102 (c) TFEU does not give grounds to dismiss the effects of 
anticompetitive conduct form the analysis whenever discrimination is concerned. Being not able 
to offer a lower the standard of proof for anticompetitive behaviour Section (c) also did not provide 
useful guidance in respect of specific abuses that involve discrimination. Perhaps, that is one of 
the reasons why Section (c) is not so commonly relied upon by the Commission as well.142 The 
Commission also does not employ discrimination in its latest Google (Shopping) Decision143 
where the facts of the case could support a convincing theory of harm and by doing so promote a 
concept of exclusionary discrimination.144    
As a result, the EU approach towards leveraging or extension of market power has formed through 
a chain of key cases in the realm of Art. 102 TFEU, Section (b). The Continental Can emphasized 
general prohibition on the strengthening of a dominant position to the detriment of competition on 
the relevant market.145 The CBEM included the extension of a dominant position in the scope of 
prohibited conduct.146 Tetra Pak II revealed that the effects of abuse in order to be considered do 
not need to be apparent on the same market as the conduct itself. The Court defined at least three 
ways in which non-merit-based competition on multiple related markets can lead to an extension 
of dominance: through conduct on the dominated market with the effect on an adjacent market. 
Through conduct and effect both on an adjacent market and through conduct on an adjacent market 
with the effect on the dominated market.147 This classification provided a foundation for future 
leveraging cases. The Court went further in Microsoft where it treated multiple episodes of abuse 
as a leveraging strategy imposing a single fine.148 Although the judgment was criticised for its 
ordoliberal incline149 it nevertheless marked the course of the EU policy in respect of leveraging 
as conduct in opposition to merit competition on multiple related markets.  
                                                 
142 For example, discrimination was excluded from the ambit of Guidance Paper. See Guidance on the Commission's 
enforcement priorities in applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to abusive exclusionary conduct by dominant 
undertakings [2009] O.J. C. 45, 24.2.2009, p. 7–20. [hereinafter Guidance Paper]. 
143 Google (Shopping), supra note 9.  
144 Ibid. 
145 Case 6-72, Europemballage Corporation and Continental Can Company Inc. v Commission [1973] EU:C:1973:22 
[hereinafter Continental Can], paragraph 26. 
146 CBEM, supra note 122, para. 27. 
147 Tetra Pak II, supra note 123, para. 25. 
148 Microsoft, supra note 120, para. 1348. 
149 Christian Ahlborn and David S. Evans, 'The Microsoft Judgment And Its Implications For Competition Policy 
Towards Dominant Firms In Europe' (2009) 75 Antitrust Law Journal 887. 
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3.1.3. Comparison of the US and EU approach 
A brief comparison of the EU and US approaches to the extension of market power provides 
valuable insights into the evolution of thought behind the leveraging concept. Convergence points 
can be found in attitude towards quantifiable nature of competition, intent, and probabilities. 
3.1.3.1 Quantifiable nature of competition 
The Continental Can made a clear distinction between distortion and elimination of competition.150 
This resembles the way in which US courts distinguish between leveraging, probable and actual 
monopolization.151 Zero tolerance towards competition distortion unites the EU approach with the 
Berkey leveraging doctrine. In both cases, competition is seen as a measurable non-binary 
concept152 susceptible to natural fluctuation and artificially caused distortion. While the former is 
a result of competition on merit, the latter is caused by the use of “methods different from those 
governing normal competition on the basis of the performance of commercial operators”.153 The 
suggested analogy seems to go in line with the general logic of the EU decisional practice154  and 
case law on dominance abuse. The latter point is confirmed by the absence of an appreciabillity 
threshold for conduct falling under Art. 102 TFEU.155 This demonstrates that the EU approach 
shares important conceptual similarities with the leveraging doctrine even outside of Art. 102 (c) 
TFEU.  At the same time, where the EU case law has adopted a probabilistic approach to negative 
effects on consumer welfare156 the Berkey doctrine assumes them.157 Meanwhile, the question of 
whether non-merit-based advantages inevitably lead to consumer harm has never been answered 
in a negative way.  On the contrary, it seems each non-merit advantage obtained by a market player 
should automatically put other players competing on merit at a disadvantage. This decreases the 
                                                 
150 In the words of the Court: “institution of a system ensuring that competition in the Common Market is not distorted 
… requires a fortiori that competition must not be eliminated”. See Continental Can, supra note 145, para 24.  
151 See section 3.1.1. 
152 The Court continuously uses the expression “the maintenance of the degree of competition still existing in the 
market or the growth of that competition”. See Post Danmark I, supra note 140, para. 24. Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La-
Roche v Commission [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:36, paragraph 91. 
153 Post Danmark I, supra note 140, para. 24. 
154 For example, in Telekomunikacja Polska the Commission stated that “for establishment of likely effects of refusal 
to supply … it is sufficient that rivals are disadvantaged and consequently compete less aggressively”. See 
Commission Decision No. COMP/39.525 (Telekomunikacja Polska), 2011 O.J. C. 324, 9.11.2011, p. 7–10., para. 818, 
upheld in Case T-486/11 Orange Polska S.A. v European Commission [2015] ECLI:EU:T:2015:1002. 
155 Post Danmark II, supra note 141, para 73.  
156 See section 3.1.3.2. 
157 See section 3.1.1. 
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value of investments in efficiency on the market for everyone including the infringer158 inevitably 
discouraging innovation and denying its benefits to consumers.  It follows that non-merit 
advantage and consumer harm should be seen as the two sides of the same coin. Convincing as it 
may sound this logical model is not supported by case law under Section (b) or (c) Art. 102 
TFEU159 since it does not go in line with the probabilistic effect-based approach to exclusionary 
abuses proclaimed by the Commission Guidance paper.160  
3.1.3.2. Probabilistic approach: likeliness, likelihood, and capability 
The probabilistic approach towards negative effects brings Art. 102 TFEU closer to the US 
attempted monopolization claim rather than to leveraging doctrine. In the former, the standard is 
set at a dangerously high probability of monopolization.161 The US case law maintains some 
vagueness regarding the precise meaning of dangerous probability.162 So does the EU case law in 
respect of consumer harm probability required in order to establish abuse.  
In the EU legal system, only  conduct with actual or likely negative effects can be abusive.163 There 
was no definition of likeliness until the Court clarified that practices were only caught by Art. 102 
TFEU in so far as they were capable of having an anticompetitive effect.164 The latter finding did 
not resolve the vagueness entirely since the notion of capability was left undefined by the Court in 
the same manner as the notion of likeliness before it.165  Meanwhile, the conditions to consider 
include the position of the dominant firm on the market, the share of the market affected by the 
practice and conditions agreed with customers.166  In case the capability is demonstrated it sets a 
                                                 
158 In the same way as printing money causes a pick of inflation. This argument was used by the Commission in 
Microsoft, supra note 120, para 1125 
159 British Airways, supra note 139, para. 144.  
160 Ibid, note 142. 
161 Commonwealth v. Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55, 177 Mass. 267 (1901). Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905). 
See J Holmes Opinion. 
162Neither it gives definitive guide on how to determine when “an act comes dangerously close to its consummation”. 
Ibid, note 161.  Meanwhile, the use of a literary and subjective characteristic such as “dangerous” in order to describe 
an inherently quantifiable mathematical concept of “probability” sends out a signal that courts are likely to avoid 
engaging in quantitative analysis and rely on qualitative approach instead. 
163 Post Danmark I, supra note 140, para 44. 
164 Case T-203/01, Michelin v Commission [2003] ECLI:EU:T:2003:250 [hereinafter Michelin II], para. 239.  Case C-
413/14 P, Intel Corporation Inc v Commission [2017] EU:C:2017:632 [hereinafter Intel Appeal], para 138. Guidance 
Paper, supra note 142, para. 23.  
165 Perhaps, that is why the Commission continues to refer to both standards in its decisions. See Google (Shopping), 
supra note 9, para 341.  
166 Intel Appeal, supra note 164, para 139.  
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rebuttable presumption of abuse.167 The Court did not set the standard of capability at its highest 
possible level.  For example, it is lower than a standard of likelihood proposed by AG Wahl in his 
Opinion on the same case.168 Wahl proposed a two-step framework where practices that reveal a 
“sufficient degree of harm” on competition would fall under the standard of likelihood and be 
presumed anticompetitive skipping case-by-case analysis.  Practices below that standard would be 
marked as capable of causing harm to competition and should be evaluated on case-by-case basis. 
This logically aligns with the distinction that exists among restrictions by object and effect under 
Art. 101 TFEU.169 The Court did not support that line of thought. Perhaps, because setting the 
standard of proof at a higher level would render meaningless the possibility of providing objective 
justification reinforced in Intel.170 Instead, the Court simply stated that it is necessary to assess 
evidence provided by the defendant in support of the claim that the conduct was not capable to 
cause anticompetitive effects.171 Where exactly lies the threshold of capability standard is left for 
the future case law to establish. How close would be the standard of capability to a simple 
assumption of negative effects on consumer welfare would determine the actual content of the 
effect-based approach. This question is particularly relevant for the legal assessment of practices 
favouring own business inherent in multi-sided digital markets and conditions under which such 
practices should be considered abusive.172 
3.1.3.3. Role of intent 
The perception of intent in the EU competition case law has formed in the course of the debate on 
object and effect abuses.173 Under Art. 101 TFEU an agreement allegedly prohibited by object has 
to be tested for its wording, “the objectives” and the relevant economic context.174 The parties’ 
intention does not make a part of the test.175 This can be interpreted as recognition of the fact that 
                                                 
167 Ibid. 
168 Opinion of Advocate General Wahl, Case C-413/14 P Intel Corporation Inc v Commission [2017] EU:C:2016:788, 
para 117. 
169 Art. 101 (1) TFEU. 
170 Intel Appeal, supra note 164, para. 140. 
171 Intel Appeal, supra note 164, para. 144. 
172 This is the main issue of the Google (Shopping) decision. Supra note 9. 
173  Case 56/65, Société Technique Minière (L.T.M.) v Maschinenbau Ulm GmbH (M.B.U.) [1966] 
ECLI:EU:C:1966:38[hereinafter STM], p. 249. 
174 Case C-501/06 P, GlaxoSmithKline v Commission [2009] ECLI:EU:C:2009:610 [hereinafter Glaxo], para 58. Case 
C-8/08, T-Mobile Netherlands BV, KPN Mobile NV, Orange Nederland NV and Vodafone Libertel NV v Raad van 




intent is a subjective and individual category that becomes tangible only when expressed in an 
agreement. Meanwhile, intent can transform significantly. Reliance on the objective rather than 
intent simplifies the task from an evidential point of view.176 Unlike in case with agreements, intent 
for unilateral conduct is rarely expressed in a consolidated form before implementation. This 
dissolves the difference between intent and objective in the meaning of Art. 101 TFEU. 177 
Traditionally under Art. 102 TFEU intent constituted the second tire of the As Efficient Competitor 
(AEC) test applied in situations when pricing benchmark alone could not result in a presumption 
of pro- or anti-competitive behaviour.178 Intent mainly lost its role when the Court switched to 
effect-based approach,179  first, by adding likely effects as an alternative criterium to the AEC 
test180 and then by declaring the AEC test only one of many available instruments.181 The turn 
represented a logical step in line with the objective nature of abuse concept emphasized by the 
early case law.182 In Michelin II the Court went further and equalized anticompetitive object and 
effect for the purposes of Art. 102 TFEU.183 This rendered the element of intent non-compulsory 
bringing the EU approach closer to the US leveraging doctrine.  
3.1.3.4. Conclusion on comparison 
Sections above demonstrated conceptual parallels between Art. 102 TFEU and the Berkey doctrine 
in terms of zero tolerance to competition distortion and irrelevance of intent. Meanwhile, it is not 
clear exactly how far lie the two standards due to the undefined nature of capability under Art. 102 
TFEU. It is likely that the future case law will not set the standard too high since it would upset 
the two-step abuse-justification scheme of Art. 102 TFEU. Setting the standard too low, on the 
other hand, would be contrary to the spirit of the effect-based approach proclaimed by the 
Commission. In any case, clarification of the standard would encourage reliance on objective 
justification under Art. 102 TFEU.  
                                                 
176 The opposite strategy would most likely require internal documents proving the intent often obtained during dawn 
raids.  
177 On difficulties of coherent application of the two articles due to their subject and structure see Lucas Peeperkorn, 
'Coherence in The Application Of Articles 101 And 102: A Realistic Prospect Or An Elusive Goal?' (2016) 39 World 
Competition, 389. 
178 Case C-62/86, AKZO v Commission [1991] ECLI:EU:C:1991:286 [hereinafter AKZO], para. 65. 
179 Guidance Paper, supra note 142, para 5.  
180 Post Danmark I supra note 140. 
181 Case T-286/09 RENV, Intel Corporation v Commission [2014] ECLI:EU:T:2014:547 [hereinafter Intel], paras. 
150-151, not overruled in this part by Intel Appeal, supra note 164. Post Danmark II, supra note 141, para 57. 
182 Hoffman-La-Roche, supra note 152. 
183 Michelin II, supra note 164, para 241.  
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3.2. Elements of abusive leveraging 
Case law suggests that there are three key features that unite leveraging cases in a separate group. 
These features include involvement of a dominant firm in activities on several markets,184 a close 
connection between those markets185 and an associative link between dominance and abusive 
conduct.186 At first sight, all three elements seem pretty uncomplicated. The first feature is not 
surprising when it comes to the extension of market power from one market to another. The 
question of multiple markets only gains complexity in the context of tying where it translates into 
a debate on several separate products vs one aggregated product.187 The third element of the causal 
link between dominance and abuse is seen as naturally tied to the second element of connection 
between the markets.188 However, the seeming simplicity of the two out of three elements is 
deceitful since in some cases the behavioral patterns similar to leveraging could be seen within 
only one market189 and some types of inter-market connections seem to encourage leveraging more 
than others.   
3.2.1. Multiple markets and connections between them 
Case-law on leveraging often touches upon multiple markets and connections between them but 
rarely goes beyond defining main and adjacent markets. 190  Apart from some classificatory 
attempts191 very little effort has been made to clarify the general principles according to which 
different kinds of connections affect consumer welfare when it comes to leveraging. Even less so, 
to test the general assumption that leveraging requires the involvement of multiple markets. This 
                                                 
184  Joined Cases 6/73 and 7/73 Commercial Solvents v Commission [1974] ECLI:EU:C:1974:18 [hereinafter 
Commercial Solvents], para. 22. CBEM , supra note 122, para. 26 
185 Case T-219/99, British Airways v Commission [2003] ECLI:EU:T:2003:343, para 127, not overruled in British 
Airways, supra note 139. 
186 It is necessary to demonstrate a causal link when the conduct and its effect appear outside of the dominant market. 
See Tetra Pak II, supra note 123, para 27. 
187 Microsoft, supra note 120, para 944. 
188 In Tetra Pak II the Court found that it is due to this connection a dominant firm can enjoy a degree of freedom on 
an adjacent market that justifies the imposition of special responsibilities under Art. 102 TFEU. See Tetra Pak II, 
supra note 123, paras 24, 30. 
189 See for example Post Danmark II, supra note 141, Intel Appeal, supra note 164. 
190 For example, see Tetra Pak II, supra note 123. 
191 For the distinction between vertical and horizontal leveraging see Pietro Crocioni, 'Leveraging Of Market Power 
In Emerging Markets: A Review Of Cases, Literature, And A Suggested Framework' (2007) 4 Journal of Competition 
Law and Economics 449.  
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section will challenge the multiple market premise and suggest a general classification of 
connections between markets involved in leveraging based on case study. 
3.2.1.1. Tying 
Being one of the most studied forms of leveraging tying strongly affected the general view on the 
latter. Importantly, ting can be both an exploitative and exclusionary abuse. Exploitative tying 
harms the consumer directly by introducing a negatively valued element to the bundle. Since there 
is no demand for the tied good among the affected group in the first place, exploitative tying does 
not extend market power to the tied good market and therefore does not constitute a leveraging 
practice. Exclusionary tying, on the contrary, is a classic form of leveraging. It harms consumers 
indirectly by eliminating efficient competitors on the tied good market. The leveraging effect is 
achieved through the introduction of a positively valued good into the bundle and undermining 
demand for its substitutes on the tied market.192 The strategy can only be effective when the 
affected consumer group expressed independent demand for the tying as well as for the tied good 
before they were bundled. In a situation like this, a shared consumer base connects the two markets 
serving as a fulcrum for market power leveraging. In most cases, the two markets share consumer 
base when they trade in direct supplements, but this is not always the case.193 Although tying is 
one of the most intuitive forms of market power leveraging, nearly any exclusionary practice or a 
combination of them194 can serve leveraging purposes.  
3.2.1.2. Rebates, exclusive dealing, predatory pricing 
In Hoffmann-La-Roche the Court concluded that the company acted contrary to Art. 102 TFEU by 
using a system of loyalty rebates linked to exclusivity arrangements.195 Meanwhile, the reason why 
the company was able to force such a strategy on its customers, links to the fact that Roche was 
active in several markets and was dominant on most of them.196 Most of its customers were large 
                                                 
192 For example, Microsoft, supra note 120, para. 872.  
193 For examples of direct supplements see Case T-30/89, Hilti v Commission [1991] ECLI:EU:T:1991:70 [hereinafter 
Hilti] (guns and nails), Tetra Pak II, supra note 123, (machines and cartoon). For a case not including direct supplement 
see Microsoft, supra note 120, (Windows operating system and streaming media player).  
194 For example, in Microsoft, supra note 120, leveraging on two markets was achieved through a combination of 
abusive tying and refusal to supply. 
195 Hoffmann-La-Roche, supra note 152, paras. 90, 95. 
196 Ibid, para 68. 
36 
 
scale users that purchase entire range to vitamins.197 Roche was able to use a shared consumer base 
and rebate strategy to bundle vitamins together and leverage demand for own product on the 
markets where its presence was not so strong.198 In order to qualify Roche’s actions as loyalty 
rebates incompatible with Art. 102 TFEU it was necessary to show dominance on all markets 
involved.199  According to the formula devised in Tetra Pak II as leveraging Roche’s conduct is 
incompatible with Art. 102 TFEU, regardless of dominance on all markets.200 Dominance on only 
some of distinct but associated through shared consumer base markets provided Roche with a 
sufficient degree of freedom allowing it to raise switching costs and prevent multi-homing with an 
aim to exclude competitors. Leveraging elements could be recognized in many other cases on 
rebates and exclusive dealing. In Post Danmark II, the Court defined and considered only one 
relative market of bulk mail, weighting under 2 kg where Post Danmark abused its dominance by 
imposing potentially harmful retroactive rebates.201 In case the, Court defined two markets, the 
contested conduct could be seen as an extension of a dominant position from the main market of 
direct advertising mail weighted under 50 grams where Post Danmark held a statutory monopoly 
to the adjacent market of other types of mail within the bulk mail segment.202 Like in Hoffmann-
La-Roche rebates allowed Post Danmark to leverage its market power by means of the “suction to 
itself of the contestable part of demand”.203 Similar to Post Danmark II rebates in Intel allowed 
the undertaking to leverage its economic power from non-contestable to contestable share of 
demand on a single CPUs market.204 This shows that the premise of involvement of multiple 
markets being essential for leveraging 205  is not entirely accurate. In fact, in non-vertically 
integrated systems, it is the division of demand to contestable and non-contestable206 shares within 
one consumer group that is essential for leveraging. At the same time, it is irrelevant whether the 
two parts of demand fall on different segments of one market or distinct markets. This leads to one 
                                                 
197 Ibid, note 152, facts, (c), p. 466.  
198 Ibid, note 152, para. 68. The company was found dominant on markets of vitamins A, B2, B6, C, E, H, but not B3. 
199 Ibid, note 152, paras. 50-68. 
200 Tetra Pak II, supra note 123, paragraph 27. 
201 Post Danmark II, supra note 141, para. 14. 
202 In that case, the fact of statutory monopoly perhaps could justify a definition of direct advertising mail under 50 
grams as a separate market.  
203  Post Danmark  II, supra note 141, para. 35. Case C-549/10 P, Tomra and Others v Commission [2012] 
ECLI:EU:C:2012:221 [hereinafter Tomra], para. 78.  
204 Intel, supra note 181, para. 92.  
205 Ibid, note 189. Tetra Pak II, supra note 123, para. 25. 
206 The demand does not always have to be absolutely non-contestable like in case with a statutory monopoly. Low 
demand elasticity can serve the same end. Reference to non-contestability will be used for simplicity.  
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of the two possible conclusions. Either involvement of multiple markets is not a necessary 
condition for leveraging. Or in all cases concerning “suction of demand” where the Court defined 
only one relevant market it could be said to engage in simplification.207  
Predatory pricing as well can serve leveraging purposes. In that case, it takes the form of cross-
subsidization between related markets. 208  In Tetra Pak II the Commission alleged that the 
undertaking could afford predatory prices on the adjacent market due to its dominant position on 
the main market. 209  Although this argument was considered irrelevant by the Court 210  it 
nevertheless demonstrates that leveraging through shared consumer base can involve nearly any 
exclusionary practice. Interestingly, in the latter case, the strategy did not rely on a shared 
consumer base since price manipulation allowed to lure consumers rather than to force them into 
dealing like in case of tying. 
3.2.1.3. Refusal to supply, margin squeeze 
Practices like refusal to supply and margin squeeze serve the purpose of raising rivals’ costs.211 In 
that case, the connection between the markets is realized through a supply chain and the fulcrum 
over which market power can be leveraged is represented by input into the downstream product.212 
Based on how vital is restricted input for the downstream competitors the case law treats it as 
essential or non-essential.213  Essential input can be subdivided into direct and indirect. Raw 
                                                 
207 Application of the SSNIP test to a market with a statutory monopoly like in Post Danmark II, for example, should 
not be effective.  
208 Ambulanz, supra note 73, is a classical case on cross-subsidization as well demonstrates elements of cross-market 
leveraging.   
209 Commission Decision No. 92/163/EEC (Tetra Pak II), 1991 O.J. L L 072, paras. 117, 147. 
210 Tetra Pak II, supra note123, para. 186. 
211 Guidance Paper treats these practices as a broad range of refusal to supply actual or constructive. See Guidance 
Paper, supra note 142, paras. 78-80. According to the settled case law refusal to supply is a separate abuse from other 
abuses where product or service is supplied on disadvantageous terms such as margin squeeze. See case C-52/09, 
Konkurrensverket v TeliaSonera Sverige AB [2011] ECLI:EU:C:2011:83 [hereinafter TeliaSonera], para. 56. 
212 Or buying power if dominance is leveraged up-stream.  
213 Or “indispensable” in the CJ terminology, see for example TeliaSonera, supra note 211, para. 82.  Or “objectively 
necessary” in the terminology of Guidance Paper, supra note 142, see para. 83. 
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materials214 and spare parts215 fall within the first category while the second includes essential 
facilities such as interoperability info,216 other IP rights217 and networks.  
3.2.1.4.  Conclusion on elements 
Leveraging can take place in vertically and non-vertically integrated systems.218  The premise of 
multiple markets holds in vertical setups where upstream undertakings use their control over input 
and aim to inhibit the supply of downstream competitors. In that case, control over input connects 
the markets and serves as a fulcrum for leveraging. In non-integrated systems undertakings that 
enjoy control over the uncontestable share of demand219 use it to suck to itself the contestable share 
by directly forcing the consumer to deal or price-manipulating him to the same end. In that case, 
leveraging can take place between separate markets or segments of the same market. Control over 
demand often can be obtained due to the shared consumer base220 that connects the markets and 
serves as a fulcrum for market power leveraging. Although both vertical and non-vertical setups 
provide similarly abundant opportunities for abuse differences between them should be considered 
when it comes to objective justification.  
3.3. Qualification of leveraging under Art. 102 TFEU 
One of the problems of Art. 102 TFEU is that it does not cover all potentially harmful leveraging 
practices many of which are new and characteristic for the multi-sided digital economy. Analysis 
of standards of proof applied to different types of leveraging abuses helps to draw the line between 
practices falling under and out of the ambit of Art. 102 TFEU. 
  
                                                 
214 For the case law on raw materials see Commercial Solvents, supra note 184, CBEM, supra note 122. 
215 Case 22/78, Hugin Kassaregister AB and Hugin Cash Registers Ltd v Commission [1979] ECLI:EU:C:1979:138 
[hereinafter Hugin].  Case 53/87, CICRA and Others v Renault [1988] ECLI:EU:C:1988:472 [hereinafter Renault]. 
Case 238/87, AB Volvo v Erik Veng (UK) Ltd. [1988] ECLI:EU:C:1988:477 [hereinafter Volvo]. 
216 See Microsoft, supra note 120. 
217See joined cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications 
Ltd (ITP) v Commission [1995] ECLI:EU:C:1995:98 [hereinafter Magill], case Case C-418/01, IMS Health GmbH & 
Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG. [2002] ECLI:EU:C: 2004:257 [hereinafter IMS Health]. 
218 This sometimes means no integration at all. For example, see Case C-163/99, Portugal v Commission [2001] 
ECLI:EU:C:2001:189 [hereinafter Portuguese Airports]. In Portuguese Airports the airport authority applied a system 
of quantity discounts constructed to disproportionately favor Portuguese airlines in the absence of integration.  
219 Ibid, note 206.  
220 But not necessarily so like in the case with predatory pricing, see section 3.2.1.2. 
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3.3.1. Standards based on demand manipulation 
The standard for tying has taken its modern shape221 in Microsoft.222 The Court has affirmed that 
tying practices can be considered contrary to Art. 102 TFEU if four elements are present. First, the 
practice concerns two separate products. Second, the infringer is dominant on the tying market. 
Third, the consumer is deprived of the choice to buy tying product separately from the tied one. 
Fourth, the practice is capable of foreclosing more efficient competitors.223  The standard for 
predatory pricing was first defined in AKZO224 and then updated in Post Danmark I. According to 
the standard pricing under the benchmark225 capable of excluding competitors at least as efficient 
as the dominant firm were contrary to Art. 102 TFEU.226 The standard for exclusive dealing was 
first formulated in Hoffmann-La-Roche, where the Court has stated that exclusive practices that 
constitute barriers to entry are abusive “by object”.227 The Guidance Paper later added to the test 
likely foreclosure effect.228 The updated standard for loyalty rebates comes from Intel. It captures 
loyalty-forming practices that are capable of excluding equally efficient competitors.229 
3.3.2. Standards based on supply inhibition 
The standard for refusal to supply was shaped by the Court in Bronner230 and Magill 231 and 
updated in Microsoft. The test requires to demonstrate indispensability of the refused input,232 
limited technical development to prejudice of the consumer as a result of the refusal to supply and 
                                                 
221 In accordance with the effect-based approach. Supra note 179.  
222 Microsoft, supra note 120, para 859 supporting the Commission Decision No. COMP/C-3/37.792 (Microsoft), 2004 
O.J. L 32, 6.2.2007 [hereinafter COMP/C-3/37.792 Microsoft], p. 23–28, para. 794. Also reflected in Guidance Paper, 
supra note 142, paras. 47-74. 
223 Ibid. 
224 AKZO, supra note 178, paras. 71,71. 
225 Post Danmark I, supra note 140, para. 37.  
226 Post Danmark I, supra note 140, para. 25. The first part of the test was formulated in more general terms in 
Compagnie Maritime Belge as an unproportionate response to competitors. Case T-24/93, Compagnie Maritime Belge 
transports and Others v Commission [1996] ECLI:EU:T:1996:139, para. 148. Reformulated in more precise terms as 
selective above cost price cutting designed to eliminate competitors in Cases C-395 and 396/96 P Compagnie Maritime 
Belge Transports and Others v Commission [2000] ECLI:EU:C:2000:132 [hereinafter Compagnie Maritime Belge], 
para. 137. 
227 Hoffmann-La-Roche, supra note 152, para. 90. 
228 Guidance Paper, supra note 142,  paras. 20, 36, 40, 71. 
229 Intel Appeal, supra note 164, para. 140.  
230 Case C-7/97, Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v Mediaprint Zeitungs- und Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. KG, 
Mediaprint Zeitungsvertriebsgesellschaft mbH & Co. KG and Mediaprint Anzeigengesellschaft mbH & Co. KG. [1998]  
ECLI:EU:C:1998:569 [hereinafter Bronner], paras 45-46. 
231 Magill, supra note 217, paras. 52-56.  
232 Microsoft, supra note 120, para. 369. 
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that such behaviour is likely to eliminate competition. 233  In Deutsche Telecom the Court 
established a separate standard for margin squeeze.234 It outlines nuances it in Telefónica and Telia 
Sonera formulating it as spread insufficient to cover costs of retail for the dominant undertaking235 
under the condition that such practice is capable of excluding efficient competitors by making new 
entry more difficult or impossible for them.236  
3.3.3. Leveraging practices within and out of the reach of Art. 102 TFEU 
Each standard under analysis demonstrates a similar two-folded stricture. It has a form and effect-
oriented part.  The former regards elements specific for a particular type of abuse such as loyalty 
forming arrangement237 or consumer choice deprivation.238  Whilew the later concerns capability 
to restrict competition and serves as a measure of gravity and a common denominator for all types 
of abuses. The two-folded structure of standards is a result of a shift towards more effect-based 
approach throughout the history of competition policy.239 Indeed the emphasis moved from the 
form of abuse to its effect, but the case law did not abolish the formal analysis completely. As a 
result, it is not clear whether the form of abuse should retain any importance at all. And if so, what 
should happen with practices that do not technically fall under any formal standard but still are 
capable of restricting competition and therefore constitute new forms of abuses.  
In fact, the recent case law suggests that the form is important.240 While the effect-based standard 
defines whether a conduct should qualify as an abuse under Art. 102 TFEU, the formal standard 
classifies it within Art. 102 TFEU. Therefore, every time the Court pronounces that a particular 
behaviour constitutes a separate kind of abuse241 it establishes a new formal standard adding it to 
the common effect-based part. The classification within Art. 102 TFEU in its turn defines the pool 
of remedies available to the Commission242 and at the same time, possible objective justifications.  
                                                 
233 Ibid, paras. 560-564. 
234 Case C-280/08 P, Deutsche Telekom v Commission [2010] ECLI:EU:C:2010:603 [hereinafter Deutsche Telekom], 
para. 183. 
235 Or its competitors in certain cases. See Telia Sonera, supra note 211, paras. 32-33, 45-46, 73-74.  
236 Telia Sonera, supra note 211, paras. 63-64. Case C-295/12 P, Telefónica and Telefónica de España v Commission 
[2014] ECLI:EU:C:2014:2062 [hereinafter  Telefónica], para. 124.  
237 Supra note 229. 
238 Supra note 222. 
239 Supra note 179. 
240 Intel, supra note 181, paras. 219-220. 
241 Supra note 234. 
242 Commercial Solvents, supra note 184, para 45. 
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The connection between the form of abuse and the remedies was first outlined in Commercial 
Solvents.243 The Court stated that the Commission can either order to “make good” the effects of 
an abuse on the competitors through a certain action or just prohibit the continuation of the 
abuse.244 For example, the imposition of a duty to deal would be a proper remedy for refusal to 
supply. 245  Therefore the remedy is encoded in the problem. The correlation between the 
classification of abuse within 102 TFEU and objective justification is strong as well. Among other 
things the standard for objective justification formulated in Post Danmark I requires to show that 
the contested conduct was necessary to achieve the benefit compensating for the consumer 
harm.246 In other words, the standard requires to show that there is no better way to achieve the 
same benefit. In case the Commission identifies a better way that was not implemented by the 
undertaking it will assign it as a remedy. Therefore, the remedy and objective justification are two 
sides of one coin and therefore both are affected by the form of abuse.   
While still recognizing the importance of the formal tests the Court sends out signals against the 
rigid necessity to fit contested conduct into a single settled form of abuse.247  Meanwhile, the 
content and the scope of legal norms shift over time. Considering that, the best way to define the 
extent of Art. 102 TFEU reach is to picture a sum of all formal standards developed by the Court 
in respect of a particular group of abuses.248 It can be said that in respect of leveraging abuses build 
on demand manipulation the coverage of Art. 102 TFEU is rather continuous. Meaning, not many 
practices that can potentially harm the consumer fall between the formal standards. The only 
exception is selective pricing above cost. It was found abusive in Hilti,249 Compagnie Maritime 
Belge250 and Irish Sugar.251 Unfortunately, the facts of all these cases are highly specific and do 
not allow for any generalization in respect of how to deal with new forms of abuse. The situation 
is different in the context of leveraging abuses aiming at competitors’ supply. The abuses of margin 
squeeze and refusal to supply are very close by their nature.252 However, there is a significant gap 
                                                 
243 Ibid. 
244 Ibid. 
245 Ibid, para. 46.  
246 Post Danmark II supra note 141, para. 42. Guidance Paper, supra note 142, paras 30,31.  
247 Supra note 148.  
248 In fact, that applies to any legal norm.  
249 Hilti, supra note 193. 
250 Compagnie Maritime Belge., supra note 226. 
251 Case T-228/97, Irish Sugar v Commission [1999] ECLI:EU:T:1999:246. 
252 In the Guidance Pater the Commission considers margin squeeze as a constructive refusal to supply. See Guidance 
paper, supra note 142, paras. 75-90. 
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between the two standards. It follows from the case law that a dominant firm cannot margin 
squeeze non-essential input but perhaps can refuse to supply it.253 Meanwhile, the Bronner test254 
of what is essential is rather restrictive and may no longer reflect the reality of global markets. A 
narrow definition of the indispensable facility does not allow to qualify many potentially harmful 
practices favouring own business as a refusal to supply. By doing so it leaves them outside of any 
qualification within traditional forms of abuse entirely.  Favouring one’s business with exclusive 
access to Big data,255 online traffic,256 access to credit, reputation or other “soft” inputs that could 
not be considered indispensable according to Bronner257 fall into this missing category.  
3.3.4. Possible solutions 
Competition policy outside of Art. 102 TFEU seems to lean towards including the “soft” input 
variable into the equation. For example, some countries insist on applying merger notification 
thresholds according to the market value of companies in mergers.258 In that case, market value 
serves as a token for access to “soft” input.  The same trend is likely to arise in the context of 
abuse. There are several possible routes that the practice might take to better reflect the realities of 
the market. The case law can either make formal requirements relevant but not necessary as it did 
with the requirement of indispensability in the context of margin squeeze.259 This scenario can be 
implemented under Section (b) or (c) of Art. 102 TFEU. It can widen the Bronner criterium260 and 
qualify new practices under one of the existing forms of abuse. Or it can define a new form of 
abuse creating a new formal standard. Which route prevails should become clear in the course of 
appeal against Google (Shopping) Decision that will be discussed in one of the following chapters.  
  
                                                 
253 See section 3.3.2. 
254 Ibid, note 230. 
255 See section 2.3.2.1.1. 
256 See section 2.3.2.1.2. Self-favouring with traffic became an issue in Google (Shopping), supra note 9.  
257 Ibid, note 230. 
258  See Bundeskartellamt, 'Guidance On Transaction Value Thresholds For Mandatory Pre-Merger Notification 
(Section 35 (1A) GWB And Section 9 (4) Kartg)' (2018) 
<https://www.bundeskartellamt.de/SharedDocs/Publikation/EN/Leitfaden/Leitfaden_Transaktionsschwelle.pdf?__bl
ob=publicationFile&v=2> accessed 26 January 2019. For the comments see Andreas Bardong, 'Germany: The 
Bundeskartellamt's New Merger Guidelines' (2012) 3 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice. 
259 TeliaSonera, supra note 211, para. 69. 
260 Ibid, note 230. 
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3.4. Conclusion on leveraging 
The concept of leveraging can be summarised as a potentially harmful extension of dominance 
from one related market or a market segment to another. The EU case law identifies the 
involvement of multiple connected markets as an essential element of leveraging. As it was 
demonstrated, a reference to multiple markets serves as tokens for contestable and non-contestable 
demand shares that can be expressed by one or several consumer groups and can fall on one or 
several markets. There are two main ways in which markets involved in leveraging can be 
connected. In vertically integrated systems it is control over input, while in non-vertically 
integrated systems it is control over the demand that is often acquired due to a shared consumer 
base. The US legal system opted to the form-based approach towards the concept of leveraging 
while the EU legal system, on the contrary, relies on effects. Meanwhile, the form still plays an 
important role in the evaluation of effects under Art. 102 TFEU since the standard of capability 
implies prediction of possible effects that can only be made based on the form of contested 
conduct. As a result, it is a combination of formal tests that defines the effective scope of Art. 102 
TFEU. Reliance on formal test with significant gaps between them creates a classification problem 
and complicates qualification of new potentially harmful practices. The CJ may respond to this 
problem in three possible ways. Which of them will prevail may become clear from the appeals 
against Google (Shopping) and Google (Android) Decisions.261  
                                                 
261 Google (Shopping), supra note 9 and Google (Android), supra note 10. 
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Chapter IV.    INTER AND INTRA-PLATFORMS LEVERAGING WITHIN ART. 102 
TFEU 
By their nature platforms deal with several consumer groups and control input on at least one of 
its sides. Therefore, it can be said that they show elements of vertical integration and are capable 
of intra-platform market power leveraging. At the same time, several platforms can form a non-
vertically integrated system by sharing one consumer groups. That provides them with a possibility 
of horizontal inter-platform market power leveraging. Distinguishing between vertical and 
horizontal leveraging might be a challenging task that lies with the Commission. The nature of a 
leveraging practice affects its classification within Art. 102 TFEU which in its turn plays a role in 
defining remedies and applying the objective justification test. This chapter will illustrate this 
premise using examples of Google (Shopping) and Google (Android)262.  
4.1. Google (Shopping) 
In Google (Shopping) the Commission fined Google Inc. (Google) and its mother company 
Alphabet Inc. (Alphabet) for self-favouring. 263  Academic community mainly supported the 
Commission in its conclusion that the conduct constituted an abuse of dominance.264 However, 
classification of the conduct under Art. 102 TFEU appeared to be problematic. 265  Judicial 
clarification of the matter may decide the future of the formal standards under Art. 102. TFEU and 
therefore is anxiously awaited.  
4.1.1. The setup 
Google is a classical non-transactional platform.266 Its main business strategy implies offering 
general search services to users free of charge, gaining user traffic and monetising the latter 
                                                 
262 Ibid. 
263 Google (Shopping), supra note 9, para. 2. 
264 See for example Edward Iacobucci and Francesco Ducci, 'The Google Search Case In Europe: Tying And The 
Single Monopoly Profit Theorem In Two-Sided Markets' (2018) 47 European Journal of Law and Economics 15. 
265 Korbinian von Blanckenburg, 'Google Search Abuses Dominant Position To Illegally Favour Google Shopping: 
An Economic Review Of The EU Decision' (2018) 20 Digital Policy, Regulation and Governance. Beata Mäihäniemi, 
'Lessons From The Recent Commission’S Decision On Google. To Favour Oneself Or Not, That Is The Question' 
(Law.nyu.edu, 2019) <http://www.law.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/upload_documents/Maihaniemi.pdf> accessed 27 
March 2019. 
266 See Section 2.2.2. above.  
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through online advertising.267 In other words, Google provides mediation between the consumer 
groups of general search users and online retailers. The system is characterised by asymmetrical 
indirect externalities268 that allow the platform to cross-subsidize the costs of zero-price trade on 
the market for general search with the advertising revenue provided by the other side of the 
platform.269 Advertising is a broad category covering multiple product markets located on the 
subsidising side of the platform. Extension of dominance to such markets allows increasing the 
overall platform’s revenue 270  but may constitute an abuse under Art. 102 TFEU. Google 
(Shopping) provides an illustration in that regard.  
After analysing of Google’s market shares,271 barriers to entry,272 multi-homing patterns273 and 
extent of countervailing buying power274 the Commission concluded that Google is dominant on 
the general search market for desktop and mobile devices.275 Its dominance allowed Google to 
engage in “more favourable positioning and display […], in its general search results pages, of its 
own comparison shopping service ("CSS”) compared to competing comparison shopping 
services”. 276 According to the Commission, the conduct was capable of having an anticompetitive 
effect on the relevant markets.277 The Commission ordered to cease the abusive practice.278 It 
adopted an open remedy approach allowing Google to choose the measure that would ensure that 
rival CSSs are treated as favourably as Google Shopping.279 To comply with the Decision Google 
agreed to treat Google Shopping as a separate profitable business unit.280 It introduced an auction-
                                                 
267  'Alphabet Inc. Annual Report For The Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2017' (2017) 
<https://abc.xyz/investor/static/pdf/20171231_alphabet_10K.pdf?cache=7ac82f7> accessed 25 March 2019 
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268 See Section 2.2.2. above. 
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274 Ibid, paras. 316-318. 
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based mechanism allowing rival CSSs and Google Shopping to bid for placement in the Google 
Shopping Unit on equal footing.281  
4.1.2. The Commission’s approach to classification of the conduct  
The Commission did not provide a clear classification of the contested conduct under Art. 102 
TFEU apart from stating that it constitutes an extension of a dominant position to an adjacent 
market.282 Meanwhile, the way in which the Commission conducted its analysis is somewhat 
confusing. It identified general search and CSSs as the two relevant product markets.283 Since the 
products are offered to consumers simultaneously on the same web-page,284 it could be assumed 
that the two markets are connected through a shared consumer base. Extension of market power 
through a consumer base represents a risk inherent in horizontal setups. For example, it could be 
classified under Art. 102 TFEU as exclusionary or exploitative tying.285 However, the Commission 
chose an alternative approach concentrating on the role of traffic as input on the CSSs market.286  
Traffic is the most valuable by-product of general search that originates from attention and 
information costs incurred by users. 287  It can be sold downstream to companies providing 
advertising services or directly to merchants. By concentrating on the input, the Commission 
treated CSSs as a type of advertising although it never explicitly mentioned that. On the contrary, 
it stated that unlike online search advertising consumers positively value CSSs.288 This finding 
delineates comparison shopping from the neighbouring products, but at the same time, it obscures 
the connection defining a relationship between the two relevant markets. Considering the nature 
of such relationship the final consumer of CSSs should be seen in online retailers and not in 
individual users of general search. This shows that the two relevant markets constitute a vertically 
integrated system which can facilitate market power leveraging through the competitors’ input 
                                                 
281 Bo Vesterdorf and Kyriakos Fountoukakos, 'An Appraisal Of The Remedy In The Commission’s Google Search 
(Shopping) Decision And A Guide To Its Interpretation In Light Of An Analytical Reading Of The Case Law' (2017) 
9 Journal of European Competition Law & Practice 3. 
282 Google (Shopping), supra note 9, para. 649. 
283 Ibid, para. 154. 
284 Ibid, para. 32. 
285 The conduct can be classified as exclusionary tying given both products have positive consumer value. In case one 
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Section 3.2.1.1. above.  
286 Google (Shopping), supra note 9, paras. 444-451, 539-588. 
287 See section 2.3.2.1.1 and 2.3.2.1.2 above.  
288 Google (Shopping), supra note 9, para. 198. 
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restriction. Based on the facts such restriction may be classified as a refusal to supply, margin 
squeeze or a third type of harmful practice. The following sections will test possible approaches 
to classification of the contested conduct in Google (Shopping) and see whether they offer any 
valuable insights in forms of platform market power leveraging.  
4.1.3. Google’s conduct as horizontal market power leveraging 
The Commission described CSSs as services to general search users and not online retailers. 289 
Therefore, markets for CCSs and general search are connected horizontally through a shared 
consumer base. This creates perfect conditions for tying suggesting the most obvious classification 
of the contested conduct. The test for abusive tying requires four elements, i.e. two products, 
dominance in the tying market, no opt-out possibility for consumers and foreclosure, to be 
present.290 The Commission established that general search and CSSs form two separate product 
markets due to their limited substitutability291  and therefore can be considered two separate 
products. The second condition is satisfied since Google was found dominant in the general search 
market.292 The third condition is satisfied since general search users cannot opt out of received 
comparison shopping services when they make a general query. The fourth condition concerns the 
effect of the contested conduct and requires demonstrating that the behaviour in question is capable 
of excluding efficient competitors from the market.293 The answer to this question depends on 
whether consumers assign a positive value to CSSs. 
4.1.3.1. Exclusionary tying 
According to the Commission, a positive consumer value distinguishes CSSs from indirectly 
solicited online advertising.294 The statement appears to be highly speculative. The fact that users 
mostly navigate CSSs through the general search and not directly through the website295 raises 
                                                 
289 Ibid, para.191. CSSs are “specialised search services that: (i) allow users to search for products and compare their 
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doubts that they perceive the difference between CCSs and online advertising. However, if the 
statement is correct, then in Google (Shopping) the Commission is dealing with a classical example 
of exclusionary tying. By tying two positively valued services Google sucks to itself the demand 
from competing CSSs.296 The question of whether such behaviour can be objectively justified 
comes into relevance. 
Although the possibility of objective justification under Art. 102 TFEU was reinforced in case 
law297 there was no example of a single successful pleading so far. The reason lies in the difficulty 
of drawing a line between justification and the initial finding of abuse.298  The standard of objective 
justification requires a benefit to be demonstrated that can mitigate or outweigh the harm caused 
to consumer welfare.299 The gains should result from the contested conduct, while the conduct 
should be necessary to achieve the gains. Most importantly the conduct should not eliminate 
effective competition.300 Exclusionary tying is unlikely to provide consumer benefit that could 
compensate for the loss of competition and innovation on the CSSs market in the long run 
particularly when the positive value of services allows their separate marketing. Meanwhile, the 
last condition of the test is unlikely to be satisfied since tying by virtue of the initial test of finding 
an abuse301 inherently threatens to eliminate all effective competition through demand suction. In 
other words, the gap between the effective standard for abusive exclusionary tying and the standard 
for objective justification is too small to accommodate any realistic factual setup.  
To resume, the way in which the Commission identified the relevant markets and insisted on the 
positive value of CSSs introduced a strong bias towards categorising the conduct as an 
exclusionary tying with slim chances for objective justification. This classification has two 
problematic aspects. First, it might rely on the erroneous premise regarding positive consumer 
value of CSSs. Second, it deals with the conduct only in one dimension representing it as horizontal 
inert-platform leveraging and providing no valuable insights in its vertical intra-platform 
component. 
                                                 
296 See Section 3.2.1.2. above. 
297 Intel Appeal, supra note 164, para. 140. 
298 Microsoft, supra note 120, para. 659. Although the case concerned IPRs, the statement is true in respect of all abuse 
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4.1.3.2. Exploitative tying 
The same market definition may lead to a different outcome in the absence of assumption regarding 
positive consumer value of CSSs. In that case, the service can be considered a type of online 
advertising.302  Positively valued by retailers on one side of the platform it would be valued 
negatively by general search users on the other side. Tying between a negatively and positively 
valued service could not destroy demand for the former.303 Instead, such conduct may be classified 
under Art. 102 (a) TFEU as exploitative tying imposing unfair trading terms. Qualification under 
Art. 102 (a) TFEU requires a definition of what constitutes “unfair” and therefore appears to be 
challenging due to the lack of a solid body of case law supporting the matter.304 Meanwhile, even 
if the abuse is established it is likely to be objectively justified. Since first, it is probable that free 
access to high-quality general search service outweighs information and attention costs. Second, 
these gains are specific to the conduct and cannot be achieved by means other than tying. Third, 
such conduct does not have any exclusionary effect. In a technical way, the objective justification 
test supports the premise stating that tying between positively and negatively valued products is 
essential for distribution of payment burden inherent in platforms relying on the advertising-based 
model.  
The latter classification better suits the facts of the case then exclusionary tying305 and provides 
important insights into externalities-shaped competition on multiple related markets through the 
application of classical tests. However, it does not grasp the exclusionary effects of vertical intra-
platform leveraging on the market for CSSs.   
4.1.4. Google’s conduct as vertical market power leveraging  
Despite setting the scene for horizontal leveraging analysis the Commission focused on Google’s 
control of traffic which represents an essential element of market power leveraging in vertically 
integrated systems.306  This analytical incoherence can be resolved if the market for CSSs is 
represented as a market for online user traffic. Being generated on one side it is resold across the 
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platform to online retailers or intermediaries that structure and refine it according to the needs of 
their customers. CSSs constitute a market of such intermediaries located downstream of the market 
for general search. Google’s control over user traffic can be seen as both control over the direct 
input or a facility through which it is accessed. In any case such control allows Google to inhibit 
competitors’ supply307 and leverage its market power vertically.  
4.1.4.1. Classification 
According to the settled case law, vertical market power leveraging can be classified as a refusal 
to supply or margin squeeze. All potentially harmful practices outside of these formal standards 
fall in the grey area and may constitute an abuse of a new type or not qualified as an abuse at all.308 
To see whether Google’s self-favouring strategy309 constitutes a new kind of abuse it is necessary 
to exclude traditional classifications first. The conduct affected two channels of user traffic 
distribution310 and therefore can be analysed as two separate episodes. First Google introduced a 
ranking mechanism demoting websites with low original content. This significantly reduced traffic 
received by all CSSs.311 Second, it created the Shopping Unit312 by reserving to itself a slot above 
Google general search results for own CSS. By doing so it exempted the latter from ranking and 
allowed it to benefit from the rich display format.313  
4.1.4.1.1. Ranking 
Google’s ranking mechanism is applied to all general search results based on the nature of the 
information they contain.314  In that respect, it treats all CSSs participating in general search 
equally. Therefore, the first episode is unlikely to be abusive on its own and does not require 
classification under Art. 102 TFEU.315  
                                                 
307 Google (Shopping), supra note 9, para. 591-607. 
 
308 See Section 3.3.3. above. 
309 Google (Shopping), supra note 9, para. 379.  
310 Ibid, para. 551.The Commission operates with the term “distribution channel”.  
311 Ibid, paras. 381-382. 
312 Ibid, para. 31 
313 Ibid, paras. 385, 388-389. 
314 See supra note 311. 
315 Google (Shopping), supra note 9, para. 611. Following a similar logic, the Commission objected not the adjustment 
mechanism per se but the fact that Google exempted own CSS from it.  
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4.1.4.1.2. Shopping Unit 
By introducing the Shopping Unit Google created an additional channel through which CSSs could 
access Google Search traffic. Reserving such channel to itself might constitute a refusal to 
supply.316 Whether this is the case can be established through the formal test largely based on the 
indispensability or Bronner standard.317  
4.1.4.1.3. The Bronner standard applicability 
The Bronner criterium identifies a conduct as a refusal to supply by showing the indispensability 
of the input for efficient competitors that wish to remain viable on the market.318 In reply to the 
Commission’s chargers, Google insisted on its applicability.319 The Commission dismissed the 
argument claiming that the Bronner criterium should only apply to the situations where a duty to 
supply is imposed as a remedy.320 This statement is problematic since it violates the general logic 
of causality according to which the formal test is required to identify the type of abuse which in 
its turn defines the remedy. This is a one-way road in the sense that the Commission cannot change 
classification of the conduct within Art. 102 TFEU solely by altering the remedy in the same way 
as a doctor can not diagnose a patient based on her own prescription. The analogy is not absolute 
since the borders between the formal standards and types of abuse are not clearly defined and the 
Commission can influence the classification of the contested conduct through its different 
interpretations. For example, in Microsoft, the lawyers argued that the conduct in the part 
concerning the Windows Media Player had to be classified as a refusal to supply and not as 
tying.321 Depending on the classification the outcome could range from alternative remedies to not 
finding an abuse at all.322 By campaigning for a different classification of the contested conduct 
within Art. 102 TFEU Microsoft lawyers tried to change the outcome of the case. Although it was 
a resourceful attempt it is questionable whether they could ever succeed. The classification of the 
                                                 
316  TeliaSonera, supra note 211, para. 55. Since It does not concern supplying of services on disadvantageous 
conditions the category of margin squeeze is irrelevant. 
317 Supra note 233.  
318 Ibid.  
319 Google (Shopping), supra note 9, para. 645 
320 Ibid, para. 651.  
321 GS McCurdy and J—Y Art, 'The European Commission’s Media Player Remedy In Its Microsoft Decision: 
Compulsory Code Removal Despite The Absence Of Tying Or Foreclosure' (2004) 25 ECLR 694. Guidance Paper, 
supra note 142, para.77. The Commission stated in the Guidance Paper that it will apply the refusal to supply standard 
in respect of the customers that did not accept tying arrangements. 
322 Supra note 308. 
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contested conduct naturally constitutes a part of the Commission’s claim. When the latter 
discharges the burden of proof for the first time323 it defines the course of the defence as well. For 
example, it would not make sense for a dominant undertaking to argue that it did not engage in 
refusal to supply if it was accused of tying. In Google (Shopping) the Commission dealt with the 
control over input in a vertical setup in the absence of transactions with the latter. Therefore, it had 
sufficient grounds to suspect a refusal to supply and apply the Bronner criterium. The fact that it 
refused to do so can be interpreted as a push against the high importance of the formal tests under 
Art. 102 TFEU. The Court may respond to this in three possible ways.  
First, it may fully support the advance. In that case, the Commission would no longer be constricted 
by formal standards and could deal with any new potentially harmful practice solely based on its 
effects. This would be a big improvement in the Commission’s challenge to accommodate new 
commercial practices with old enforcement tools.324 On the other hand, this might give too much 
freedom to the Commission risking overenforcement in respect of practices that are not sufficiently 
studied.  
Alternatively, the Court might support the initiative partially. In Deutsche Telekom, it has stated 
that margin squeeze represents a separate type of abuse and therefore should be subjected to a 
separate formal test.325  In Tetra Pak II it relaxed the formal standard by admitting that effects of 
abuse can take place on a related market.326 The same may happen in respect to self-favouring. In 
that context, the Court might establish principles according to which a new formal standard can be 
defined. This would represent a smaller but still a very important step towards the Commission’s 
goal.  
And finally, the Court might reject the suggestion. Formal standards are deeply entrenched in the 
case law on abuse. They preceded the effect-based standard and still define the latter to a great 
extent.327 Taking this into account the Court might be reluctant to dismiss them or even reduce 
their role. Such position of the Court in the absence of clear conduct classification within the settled 
types of abuse and application of the relevant formal test might mean the loss of the case for the 
                                                 
323 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 of 16 December 2002 on the implementation of the rules on competition laid 
down in Articles 81 and 82 of the Treaty, Art. 2. 
324 Supra note 7. 
325 Supra note 234. 
326 Supra note 200.  
327 See section 3.1.3.1. above.  
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Commission. The discussion on the importance of traffic for comparison shopping services and 
the absence of substitutes for it introduced into the Decision mitigates this risk by demonstrating 
that if the Bronner test was applicable it would be satisfied.328 
4.1.4.1.4. Application of the formal test 
Application of the indispensability standard often dominates the discussion in refusal to supply 
cases. Meanwhile, it represents only a part of the formal test which requires to identify a vertically 
integrated structure in which an indispensable input produced upstream is denied to competitors 
downstream.329 The test can be completed in three steps establishing the input, its indispensability 
and the fact of refusal. In cases concerning supply of spare parts,330 network facilities331 or IP 
rights332 in simple vertically integrated systems the first and the last steps are often obvious and 
do not require an extensive discussion. In the context of multi-dimensional platform competition 
where the indispensable input may be defined in several ways and refusal to supply may often be 
implicit all three elements of the formal test must be discussed.  
In the context of Google (Shopping) it is not clear how narrow the input should be defined to 
satisfy the formal test. If the input is defined too broadly it would be easy to show indispensability 
but not the fact of refusal sine a wide category implies a wide variety of channels through which 
the input can be accessed. A too narrow definition will lead to the opposite effect by making the 
refusal obvious and obscuring the indispensability. The following subsections will suggest 
different approaches to the input definition and see whether they affect the outcome. 
4.1.4.1.4.1. User traffic as the input 
The Commission describes general user traffic as essential for CSSs.333 And indeed it represents 
the direct input on the CSSs market in the widest possible sense. It cannot be substituted and 
therefore is indispensable. However, the contested conduct does not prevent Google’s downstream 
competitors from accessing it completely leaving open such channels as other search engines, 
                                                 
328 Supra note 286.  
329 IMS Health, supra note 217, para. 42. 
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mobile apps, 334  direct access through the website domain name 335  and social media.336  This 
suggests that the category of user traffic is too broad to satisfy the refusal to supply formal test.  
4.1.4.1.4.2. Traffic generated by Google general search as the input  
Input indispensability in the second widest sense would mean that the traffic produced by Google 
general search must be necessary for its downstream competitors to remain viable on the market.337 
The Commission argued that there were no viable substitutes for Google general search traffic on 
the CSSs market.338 Its analysis in that regard is rather convincing except for one element. The 
Commission treats AdWords as a potential substitute for Google’s general search results. 339 
Meanwhile, the former rather represents a sub-category of Google general search traffic and a 
channel through which the latter can be accessed. Apart from AdWords Google general search 
traffic can be accessed through organic search results and the Shopping Unit. Another possibility 
not considered by the Commission involves Google offering its organic search results to be placed 
on the third parties’ web pages.340 This allows competitors to bundle Google’s organic search 
result with any advertising including CSSs on their own web pages. Google exercises control over 
all mentioned channels, therefore the input can be considered refused if either all of them are closed 
or if open channels341 cannot offer a viable substitute for the closed ones. The Commission has 
established that this is the case in respect of AdWords.342 If the same is true for all other channels 
the formal test would confirm refusal to supply. A natural remedy for it would be a requirement to 
allow competitors access to the Google Shopping Unit. In case available channels provide a viable 
substitute for the closed ones the input must be defined even narrower.  
                                                 
334 Google (Shopping), supra note 9, para. 568. 
335 Ibid, para. 580. 
336 Ibid, paras. 585-588. 
337 Supra note 233.  
338 Google (Shopping), supra note 9, para. 568-588. 
339 Ibid, paras. 543-567. 
340 For the principles underlining implementation of such option see 'Where Do Ecosia's Search Results Come From?' 
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341 Google (Shopping), supra note 9, paras 543-588. Remarkably, the Commission applies the substitutability test to 
each channel individually. This may lead to underestimation of viable competition on the market since open channels 
complement each other for the benefit of competitors. Therefore, it seems reasonable to evaluate alternative channels 
in conjunction. 
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4.1.4.1.4.3. Traffic generated by Google Shopping Unit as the input 
Indispensability in the narrowest sense would concern only the traffic produced by Google 
Shopping Unit. The input defined in that way is clearly denied to the competitors since they are 
not allowed to participate in the latter. The indispensability of the Unit depends on whether open 
alternative channels, namely AdWords or introduction of Google organic search results on the 
third parties’ pages offer a viable substitute for the former. In the opposite case, the conduct might 
be found abusive. An effective remedy, in that case, would again be a requirement to allow 
competitors participating in the Shopping Unit.    
4.1.4.2. Conclusion on the classification of the conduct as vertical leveraging 
The previous sections have shown that in Google (Shopping) requirements of the formal test for 
refusal to supply can be fulfilled if the input is identified as Google general search traffic or Google 
Shopping Unit traffic. Therefore, grounds to classify Google’s conduct as a new type of abuse 
might be insufficient. In that context, objective justification of the conduct as a refusal to supply 
comes into relevance.  
4.1.4.3. Justification of the contested conduct 
Although it was demonstrated that Google’s conduct can be objectively justified as exploitative 
tying in the eyes of general search users343 that does not automatically mean that the contested 
conduct would be justified in the eyes of online retailers as a refusal to supply. The test for 
objective justification requires to demonstrate that there is no better way to access the conduct-
derived benefit capable of offsetting the harm.344 In the present case, the benefit resulting from the 
conduct can be defined as access to the Shopping Unit traffic for online retailers at the current 
cost.345 In that respect, the remedy assigned346 by the Commission should always represent a better 
way to achieve the same result if only such a way exists. It follows that if the remedy does not 
provide the consumer with the same or bigger benefit as the conduct it could be assumed that the 
conduct could be objectively justified.  
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Google’s auction-based mechanism347 as the remedy is problematic in that respect. The pay-for-
placement system implemented by the auction does not incentivise CSSs to innovate and compete 
on the merit. Users on either platform side cannot influence which services get the placement based 
on their price and quality. The matter is decided unilaterally by Google based on the size of the 
bid.348 Due to its vast resources, Google Shopping can often outbid its rival CSSs regardless of the 
commitment to operate at least at 20% “profit” margin.349 This allows Google to compel rival 
CSSs to “bid away the vast majority of their profits”350 and receive monopoly yield from the CSS 
market all the same. Meanwhile, placement in the Shopping Unit is often granted to advertising 
agencies certified by Google and not to genuine CSSs.351 But the main problem of the auction 
remedy is that each participant that intends to win over Google Shopping would need to place a 
bid higher than the latter. And if the latter’s bid represents the amount the Google would receive 
directly from online retailers in the absence of the auction, with the auction any rival CSSs would 
always need to charge retailers at least as much plus a bit more. In a sense, the auction sets up a 
race to the top increasing the bidders’ costs that eventually are passed on online retailers. 
Therefore, it can be assumed that the remedy does not increase the benefit for the general search 
users and decreases it for online retailers. Taking that into account it can be concluded that the 
system without an auction benefits consumer on both sides of the platform to a greater extent than 
its alternative. Therefore, the contested conduct in Google (Shopping) can be objectively justified 
as a refusal to supply as well as tying. The contested conduct in Google (Android) on the other 
hand is not susceptible to the same argumentation.  
4.2. Google (Android) 
Roughly one year after Google (Shopping) the Commission has fined Google and Alphabet an 
even bigger amount for “illegal practices regarding Android mobile devices [designed] to 
strengthen dominance of Google's search engine”.352  
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4.2.1. The setup 
Dominance in the markets for general search and application stores is particularly valuable for 
Google since these markets represent the main source of its revenue. 353 To cement the dominance, 
Google applied certain licensing conditions with respect to mobile manufacturers. The conditions 
allegedly aimed at preventing rival applications (Apps) from being pre-installed on Android-
operated mobile devices and exclusion of rival OSs allowing pre-installation of such Apps from 
the market. The strategy has been found abusive by the Commission. 354  Unlike in Google 
(Shopping) where the Commission attempted to dismiss the formal test and treat a leveraging 
strategy as a new type of abuse, in Google (Android) it assigned the episodes of abusive conduct 
to traditional classifications.   
Google was found dominant on the markets for general search, open mobile OSs, and App stores 
for Android. The conduct consisted of three episodes: tying Google Search and Chrome to Play 
Store; illegal payments to large manufacturers of mobile devices designed to ensure exclusive pre-
instalment of Google Search on Android-powered devices; and illegal obstruction of development 
and distribution of competing Android OSs (Android forks).355 Like in Google (Shopping) the 
Commission applied an open remedy approach, ordering to cease the conduct.  
4.2.2. Qualification 
Android forks compete with Android as alternative distribution channels for mobile Apps on the 
market for open-code mobile OSs. The competitors reach the final consumer though a vertically 
integrated system of mobile manufacturers356 The latter pre-install OSs and proprietary Apps of 
their choice on mobile devices and offer the compounded product to the final consumer.357 Since 
mobile manufacturers ensure communications between OSs and Apps producers and the final 
consumer, normally they are interested in following the preferences of the latter. Therefore, under 
undistorted competition, the demand among mobile manufacturers for particular OSs and Apps 
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would reflect the final consumer demand. Google licensing conditions precluded mobile 
manufacturers from pre-installation of third-party Apps on Android operated devices or 
introducing devices powered by Android forks into their portfolio. By doing so it interfered with 
the users’ ability to decide which Apps would get the placement on mobile devices based on their 
quality. In other words, it has deprived providers of the said products of the possibility to compete 
on the merit. The Commission argued that Google’s conduct is capable of harming competition on 
the markets of search engines, mobile OSs and mobile browsers. The setup described above 
suggests that the Commission is likely to receive support from the Court in respect to its assessment 
of the conduct’s effect. The following sections will analyse conduct classifications under Art. 102 
TFEU and respective objective justifications.  
4.2.2.1. Illegal tying of Google's search and browser apps 
Play Store is a transactional platform that brings together users and App producers. It is 
characterised by mutual positive externalities among the platform sides and low multi-homing 
rates among the content providers due to the high cost of the readjustment of Apps to other 
platforms. 358   These features make Google’s dominance on the market for App stores self-
propelling359 while bundling leverages Google Search and Chrome browser with the market power 
of Play Store.  The Commission has classified the conduct in this part as abusive tying.360 Indeed, 
all three products are offered to the same consumer group. And unlike in Google (Shopping) all 
tied products have positive consumer value. This allows classifying the practice as horizontal inter-
platform exclusionary tying. Such classification offers notoriously slim chances for objective 
justification and it brings the conduct as close to abuses “by object” as it is only possible under the 
effect-based approach. 361  The same applies to horizontal inter-platform leveraging though 
exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates constituting the second and the third abusive episode.   
4.2.2.2. Illegal payments conditional on exclusive pre-installation of Google Search 
Due to their size and market power, big mobile manufacturers are less susceptible to the limiting 
aspects of the contested strategy. In order to incentivise them to pre-install Google Search on 
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Android-operated devices, Google offered them payments.362 A reference to Intel in Press release 
suggests that the Commission classified  the conduct as loyalty rebates.363 And indeed, the conduct 
is relying on demand manipulation and therefore represents a horizontal inter-platform market 
power leveraging offers no clear benefits and is unlikely to be justified.  
4.2.2.3. Illegal obstruction of development and distribution of competing Android operating 
systems 
Unlike Android, Android forks allow the pre-installation of third-party Apps. This makes them the 
main distribution channel for the latter.  According to the Commission exclusion of Android forks 
from the market would leave such Apps producers without viable means to compete.364 Google 
used its dominance on markets for proprietary mobile Apps to inhibit mobile manufacturer’s 
demand for Android forks. This allowed Google to further “cement” its position on the mentioned 
markets. The conduct represents inter-platform horizontal leveraging and can be classified as 
exclusive dealing.365 An objective justification attempt for such conduct would not be abetted by 
any special circumstances linked to intra-platform connections and efficiencies.  
4.3. Conclusion on Google Decisions 
Both Google (Shopping) and Google (Android) concern platform market power leveraging. In the 
first case, Google leverages its dominance from the general search market to the market of CSSs 
using its control over user traffic as a fulcrum. In the second case, it leverages its dominance from 
the market for App Stores to the markets of general search, browsers and mobile OSs over the 
fulcrum of the shared consumer base. Despite apparent similarities, the two cases are 
fundamentally different from the perspective of formal tests and objective justification under Art. 
102 TFEU.  
Google (Android) represents a linear case of horizontal inter-platform market power leveraging 
implemented through a set of classic abusive practices with no room for alternative interpretations 
and little changes for objective justification. Google (Shopping) on the other hand is two-
dimensional. It concerns a potentially harmful conduct that simultaneously affects consumers on 
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both sides of the platform in two different way. The conduct can be interpreted as horizontal 
exploitative tying and as vertical intra-platform exclusionary market power leveraging. The latter 
interpretation can be classified under Art. 102 TFEU as a refusal to supply or a new type of abuse. 
Judicial support for the latter option could decrease the importance of formal standards under Art. 
102 TFEU and simplify competition law enforcement in respect of new commercial practices. The 
classification of the contested conduct within Art. 102 TFEU sets the tone for a remedy choice and 
defines the outcome of the objective justification test. In the context of Google (Shopping) 
multidimensional nature of abuse requires to apply the latter test and the initial test of finding abuse 
to each conduct interpretation. Therefore, a platform strategy affecting multiple consumer groups 
can only be cleared if abuse is either not found or is justified in respect of each group. In Google 
(Shopping) combination of negatively and positively valued products allows justifying the conduct 
as tying, while the absence of a better option for the consumer may justify it as a refusal to supply. 





Chapter V.    CONCLUSION 
Platforms’ special features allow them to access extra efficiencies. At the same time, they make 
them more resourceful in abusing dominance. Often competition law enforcement does not 
account for these abilities creating a risk of under or over enforcement. To resolve this issue, case 
law needs to redefine the limits of merit competition on multisided markets. In particular, resolving 
the inconsistencies created by the gap between the formal standards under Art. 102 TFEU would 
narrow the category of merit competition and ensure effective enforcement in respect of new 
commercial practices such as “soft” input manipulations. At the same time, case law needs to 
expand the category of merit competition by accounting to the fact that certain practices considered 
abusive in most traditional setups may be justified as a part of multisided business strategies.  
To illustrate this point, the present research divided practices of dominance extension into 
categories of inter and intra-platform leveraging and inquired whether they deserve a differential 
treatment in competition law enforcement. The answer to the research question was obtained 
through the comparative analysis of Google (Android) and Google (Shopping) as examples of the 
two respective categories. It has been shown that inter and intra-platform leveraging should be 
treated differently by competition law enforcement in two major ways. The first difference 
concerns interpretation and classification of the contested conduct, while the second concerns 
conditions that should be considered in the course of objective justification.  
Inter-platform leveraging practices have a horizontal nature, concern one consumer group and do 
not support multiple interpretations. Classification of such practices under Art. 102 TFEU is 
uncomplicated since formal standards for exclusionary abuses based on demand manipulation are 
sufficient to cover modern potentially harmful strategies. In that context, no additional conditions 
needed to be considered under objective justification test. In practice, it is nearly impossible to 
provide objective justification for this kind of leveraging due to a very narrow gap between the 
effect-based standard of capability and the standard of objective justification. This can be best 
illustrated by case law on former “by object” abuses such as exclusive dealing and loyalty rebates.  
Intra-platform leveraging practices, on the contrary, affect several consumer groups and support 
multiple interpretations. Each interpretation requires its own classification and justification under 
Art. 102 TFEU. Meanwhile, a conduct interpreted as vertical exclusionary abuse may either fall 
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under one of the two traditional formal standards or land between them. The latter outcome may 
lead to underenforcement. The issue can be resolved either by introducing new formal standards 
for vertical abuses or by distancing from the formal assessment of contested conduct. In that 
context, the appeal against Google (Shopping) is likely to define which route will be prevalent. 
The test for objective justification for intra-platform leveraging requires taking account of extra-
efficiencies obtained by using externalities.  
In a practical sense, findings made in the present dissertation allow to make a prognosis regarding 
Google’s appeals against the Decisions. It is suggested that the conduct’s susceptibility to objective 
justification and the fact that the Commission disregarded one alternative distribution channel in 
Google (Shopping) may provide Google with extra chances for successful appeal. Google 
(Android) on the other hand, does not concern any special circumstances discussed in the present 
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